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We introduce natural strategic games on graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in a local setting. We study the existence of equilibria that are resilient to coalitional deviations of unbounded and bounded size (i.e., strong…
Proportional dynamics, originated from peer-to-peer file sharing systems, models a decentralized price-learning process in Fisher markets. Previously, items in the dynamics operate independently of one another, and each is assumed to belong…
In population games, a large population of players, modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how…
Understanding the evolution of cooperation in multiplayer games is of vital significance for natural and social systems. An important challenge is that group interactions often leads to nonlinear synergistic effects. However, previous…
This paper considers a non-cooperative game in which competing users sharing a frequency-selective interference channel selfishly optimize their power allocation in order to improve their achievable rates. Previously, it was shown that a…
Experimental economics has repeatedly demonstrated that the Nash equilibrium makes inaccurate predictions for a vast set of games. Instead, several alternative theoretical concepts predict behavior that is much more in tune with observed…
From a context of evolutionary dynamics, social games can be studied as complex systems that may converge to a Nash equilibrium. Nonetheless, they can behave in an unpredictable manner when looking at the spatial patterns formed by the…
We study a multi-agent decision problem in large population games. Agents from multiple populations select strategies for repeated interactions with one another. At each stage of these interactions, agents use their decision-making model to…
We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of…
We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum, that we call selfishness level. It is the smallest fraction of the social welfare that needs to be…
As a schematic model of the complexity economic agents are confronted with, we introduce the ``SK-game'', a discrete time binary choice model inspired from mean-field spin-glasses. We show that even in a completely static environment,…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
This paper aims to accommodate games in which the players' dynamics are subject to un-modeled and disturbance terms. The un-modeled and disturbance terms are regarded as extended states for which observers are designed to estimate them.…
Finite-player dynamic games with dispersed private information are difficult because actions both move payoffs and reshape what opponents learn, generating hierarchies of beliefs about beliefs. This paper provides a recursive representation…
We consider a stochastic game of contribution to the common good in which the players have continuous control over the degree of contribution, and we examine the gradualism arising from the free rider effect. This game belongs to the class…
In this paper, we examine the Nash equilibrium convergence properties of no-regret learning in general N-player games. For concreteness, we focus on the archetypal follow the regularized leader (FTRL) family of algorithms, and we consider…
We provide a novel approach to achieving a desired outcome in a coordination game: the original 2x2 game is embedded in a 2x3 game where one of the players may use a third action. For a large set of payoff values only one of the Nash…
We study interpersonal trust by means of the all-or-nothing public goods game between agents on a network. The agents are endowed with the simple yet adaptive learning rule, exponential moving average, by which they estimate the behavior of…
We study the problem of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium of a game whose strategy space is continuous without access to gradients of the utility function. Such games arise, for example, when players' strategies are represented by…
Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium.…