Related papers: IFC Inside: Retrofitting Languages with Dynamic In…

In the standard web browser programming model, third-party scripts included in an application execute with the same privilege as the application's own code. This leaves the application's confidential data vulnerable to theft and leakage by…

We present an approach for dynamic information flow control across the application and database. Our approach reduces the amount of policy code required, yields formal guarantees across the application and database, works with existing…

Applications written in low-level languages without type or memory safety are especially prone to memory corruption. Attackers gain code execution capabilities through such applications despite all currently deployed defenses by exploiting…

Information flow security is classically formulated in terms of the absence of illegal information flows, with respect to a security setting consisting of a single flow policy that specifies what information flows should be permitted in the…

Safely integrating third-party code in applications while protecting the confidentiality of information is a long-standing problem. Pure functional programming languages, like Haskell, make it possible to enforce lightweight…

Noninterference guarantees that an attacker cannot infer secrets by interacting with a program. Information flow control (IFC) type systems assert noninterference by tracking the level of information learned (pc) and disallowing…

We describe a new, dynamic, floating-label approach to language-based information flow control. A labeled IO monad, LIO, keeps track of a current label and permits restricted access to IO functionality. The current label floats to exceed…

Information Flow Control (IFC) is a collection of techniques for ensuring a no-write-down no-read-up style security policy known as noninterference. Traditional methods for both static and dynamic IFC suffer from untenable numbers of false…

Smart contracts are frequently vulnerable to control-flow attacks based on confused deputies, reentrancy, and incorrect error handling. These attacks exploit the complexity of interactions among multiple possibly unknown contracts. Existing…

Large Language Model-based systems (LLM systems) are information and query processing systems that use LLMs to plan operations from natural-language prompts and feed the output of each successive step into the LLM to plan the next. This…

High assurance of information-flow security (IFS) for concurrent systems is challenging. A promising way for formal verification of concurrent systems is the rely-guarantee method. However, existing compositional reasoning approaches for…

For question-answering (QA) tasks, in-context learning (ICL) enables language models to generate responses without modifying their parameters by leveraging examples provided in the input. However, the effectiveness of ICL heavily depends on…

This paper presents LWeb, a framework for enforcing label-based, information flow policies in database-using web applications. In a nutshell, LWeb marries the LIO Haskell IFC enforcement library with the Yesod web programming framework. The…

As AI agents become increasingly autonomous and capable, ensuring their security against vulnerabilities such as prompt injection becomes critical. This paper explores the use of information-flow control (IFC) to provide security guarantees…

Secret-dependent timing behavior in cryptographic implementations has resulted in exploitable vulnerabilities, undermining their security. Over the years, numerous tools to automatically detect timing leakage or even to prove their absence…

Control-flow hijacking attacks are used to perform malicious com-putations. Current solutions for assessing the attack surface afteracontrol flow integrity(CFI) policy was applied can measure onlyindirect transfer averages in the best case…

Android apps cooperate through message passing via intents. However, when apps do not have identical sets of privileges inter-app communication (IAC) can accidentally or maliciously be misused, e.g., to leak sensitive information contrary…

Information flow analysis checks whether certain pieces of (confidential) data may affect the results of computations in unwanted ways and thus leak information. Dynamic information flow analysis adds instrumentation code to the target…

There are many familiar situations in which a manager seeks to design a system in which users share a resource, but outcomes depend on the information held and actions taken by users. If communication is possible, the manager can ask users…

Existing language-based information-flow control (IFC) tools face a fundamental tension: Denning-style systems that track explicit and implicit flows at the variable level typically require compiler modifications, while more coarse-grained…