Related papers: Mechanism Design for Team Formation
We consider a setting where one has to organize one or several group activities for a set of agents. Each agent will participate in at most one activity, and her preferences over activities depend on the number of participants in the…
Decision-making systems increasingly orchestrate our world: how to intervene on the algorithmic components to build fair and equitable systems is therefore a question of utmost importance; one that is substantially complicated by the…
Prediction markets are designed to elicit information from multiple agents in order to predict (obtain probabilities for) future events. A good prediction market incentivizes agents to reveal their information truthfully; such incentive…
We consider a coalition formation setting where each agent belongs to one of the two types, and agents' preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of the agents of their own type in each coalition. This setting differs from…
In this work, we formulate the problem of team formation amidst conflicts. The goal is to assign individuals to tasks, with given capacities, taking into account individuals' task preferences and the conflicts between them. Using dependent…
Despite the growing interest in collaborative AI, designing systems that seamlessly integrate human input remains a major challenge. In this study, we developed a task to systematically examine human preferences for collaborative agents. We…
As a Ph.D. student with a diverse background in both public and private sectors, I have encountered numerous challenges in cross-disciplinary and multi-stakeholder team projects. My research on developing team compositions that involve…
Team formation is ubiquitous in many sectors: education, labor markets, sports, etc. A team's success depends on its members' latent types, which are not directly observable but can be (partially) inferred from past performances. From the…
Hedonic games -- at the interface of cooperative game theory and computational social choice -- are coalition formation games in which the players have preferences over the coalitions they can join. Kerkmann et al. [13] introduced…
In many economic, social and political situations individuals carry out activities in groups (coalitions) rather than alone and on their own. Examples range from households and sport clubs to research networks, political parties and trade…
The paper defines a non-cooperative simultaneous finite game to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. The novelty of the game is that the game definition embeds a \textit{coalition structure…
This paper studies cooperative games where coalitions are formed online and the value generated by the grand coalition must be irrevocably distributed among the players at each timestep. We investigate the fundamental issue of strategic…
AI and humans bring complementary skills to group deliberations. Modeling this group decision making is especially challenging when the deliberations include an element of risk and an exploration-exploitation process of appraising the…
Coalition formation studies how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions under consideration of their preferences. We study the classical objective of stability in a variant of additively separable hedonic games where agents…
Mechanism design is a well-established game-theoretic paradigm for designing games to achieve desired outcomes. This paper addresses a closely related but distinct concept, equilibrium design. Unlike mechanism design, the designer's…
We study the use of Bayesian persuasion (i.e., strategic use of information disclosure/signaling) in endogenous team formation. This is an important consideration in settings such as crowdsourcing competitions, open science challenges and…
In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that…
The challenge of finding compromises between agent proposals is fundamental to AI subfields such as argumentation, mediation, and negotiation. Building on this tradition, Elkind et al. (2021) introduced a process for coalition formation…
We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Specifically, we define the problem of task allocation in which…
The issue of fairness in AI arises from discriminatory practices in applications like job recommendations and risk assessments, emphasising the need for algorithms that do not discriminate based on group characteristics. This concern is…