Related papers: The Shapley group value
In this paper, we address the problem of fair sharing of the total value of a crowd-sourced network system between major participants (founders) and minor participants (crowd) using cooperative game theory. Shapley allocation is regarded as…
We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how some fixed value should be shared among them. We are interested in settings where the share that each agent receives is based on how that agent is evaluated by other members of…
A key challenge for the safety of advanced AI systems is the possibility that multiple simpler agents might inadvertently form a collective agent with capabilities and goals distinct from those of any individual. More generally, determining…
Nguyen et al. [1] introduced altruistic hedonic games in which agents' utilities depend not only on their own preferences but also on those of their friends in the same coalition. We propose to extend their model to coalition formation…
Attribution scores reflect how important the feature values in an input entity are for the output of a machine learning model. One of the most popular attribution scores is the SHAP score, which is an instantiation of the general Shapley…
This paper generalizes L.S. Shapley's celebrated value allocation theory on coalition games by discovering and applying a fundamental connection between stochastic path integration driven by canonical time-reversible Markov chains and…
Algorithmic decisions in critical domains such as hiring, college admissions, and lending are often based on rankings. Given the impact of these decisions on individuals, organizations, and population groups, it is essential to understand…
AI and humans bring complementary skills to group deliberations. Modeling this group decision making is especially challenging when the deliberations include an element of risk and an exploration-exploitation process of appraising the…
The objective of this paper is to identify and analyze the response actions of a set of players embedded in sub-networks in the context of interaction and learning. We characterize strategic network formation as a static game of…
This paper deals with an important subject in classification problems addressed by machine learning techniques: the evaluation of the influence of each of the features on the classification of individuals. Specifically, a measure of that…
We study a game-theoretic model for pool formation in Proof of Stake blockchain protocols. In such systems, stakeholders can form pools as a means of obtaining regular rewards from participation in ledger maintenance, with the power of each…
We introduce the notion of linearly representable games. Broadly speaking, these are TU games that can be described by as many parameters as the number of players, like weighted voting games, airport games, or bankruptcy games. We show that…
This research presents a predictive model to identify potential targets of activist investment funds--entities that acquire significant corporate stakes to influence strategic and operational decisions, ultimately enhancing shareholder…
We introduce a new framework to study the group dynamics and game-theoretic considerations when voters in a committee are allowed to trade votes. This model represents a significant step forward by considering vote-for-vote trades in a…
Interactions between people are the basis on which the structure of our society arises as a complex system and, at the same time, are the starting point of any physical description of it. In the last few years, much theoretical research has…
As data becomes the fuel driving technological and economic growth, a fundamental challenge is how to quantify the value of data in algorithmic predictions and decisions. For example, in healthcare and consumer markets, it has been…
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
We introduce the class of modified Schelling games in which there are different types of agents who occupy the nodes of a location graph; agents of the same type are friends, and agents of different types are enemies. Every agent is…
Motivated by the markets operating on fast time scales, we present a framework for online coalitional games with time-varying coalitional values and propose real-time payoff distribution mechanisms. Specifically, we design two online…
The paper defines a non-cooperative simultaneous finite game to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. The novelty of the game is that the game definition embeds a \textit{coalition structure…