Related papers: Equilibrium in risk-sharing games
The uniform distribution is an important counterexample in game theory as many of the canonical game dynamics have been shown not to converge to the equilibrium in certain cases. In particular none of the canonical game dynamics converge to…
In this work, we study stochastic one-shot games where agents' utilities depend on the collective strategy profiles of other agents as well as on some well-behaved randomness. While each decision-maker is agnostic to the random variable's…
A double auction game with an infinite number of buyers and sellers is introduced. All sellers posses one unit of a good, all buyers desire to buy one unit. Each seller and each buyer has a private valuation of the good. The distribution of…
Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…
In network formation games, agents form edges with each other to maximize their utility. Each agent's utility depends on its private beliefs and its edges in the network. Strategic agents can misrepresent their beliefs to get a better…
We consider a multi-agent noncooperative game with agents' objective functions being affected by uncertainty. Following a data driven paradigm, we represent uncertainty by means of scenarios and seek a robust Nash equilibrium solution. We…
This paper introduces a novel class of multi-stage resource allocation games that model real-world scenarios in which profitability depends on the balance between supply and demand, and where higher resource investment leads to greater…
We study the security of interaction protocols when incentives of participants are taken into account. We begin by formally defining correctness of a protocol, given a notion of rationality and utilities of participating agents. Based on…
The noncooperative Nash equilibrium solution of classical games corresponds to a rational expectations attitude on the part of the players. However, in many cases, games played by human players have outcomes very different from Nash…
This paper presents an exact penalization theory of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) that has its origin from the renowned Arrow-Debreu general economic equilibrium model. While the latter model is the foundation of much of…
We study the price competition in a duopoly with an arbitrary number of buyers. Each seller can offer multiple units of a commodity depending on the availability of the commodity which is random and may be different for different sellers.…
Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such…
In an inverse game problem, one needs to infer the cost function of the players in a game such that a desired joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium. We study the inverse game problem for a class of multiplayer matrix games, where the cost…
Coordinating the behaviour of self-interested agents in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria is a major research challenge for multi-agent systems. Pre-game communication between all the players can aid coordination in cases where the…
We propose a new variant of the strategic classification problem: a principal reveals a classifier, and $n$ agents report their (possibly manipulated) features to be classified. Motivated by real-world applications, our model crucially…
This paper studies $n$-person simultaneous-move games with linear best response function, where individuals interact within a given network structure. This class of games have been used to model various settings, such as, public goods,…
A new game theoretical solution concept for open spectrum sharing in cognitive radio (CR) environments is presented, the Lorenz equilibrium (LE). Both Nash and Pareto solution concepts have limitations when applied to real world problems.…
We consider a model of priced resource sharing that combines both queueing behavior and strategic behavior. We study a priority service model where a single server allocates its capacity to agents in proportion to their payment to the…
Current fault-tolerant quantum compilers allocate error budgets uniformly during resource estimation, causing suboptimal physical resource overhead. We optimize this allocation using a potential game formulation, where Nash Equilibrium…
In this paper we present a new competitive packet routing model with edge priorities. We consider players that route selfishly through a network over time and try to reach their destinations as fast as possible. If the number of players who…