Related papers: Possible and Necessary Allocations via Sequential …
Given an initial resource allocation, where some agents may envy others or where a different distribution of resources might lead to higher social welfare, our goal is to improve the allocation without reassigning resources. We consider a…
We consider the egalitarian welfare aspects of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted cardinal utilities over the objects. We give bounds on how well different random assignment mechanisms approximate the optimal…
An intelligent agent may in general pursue multiple procedural goals simultaneously, which may lead to arise some conflicts (incompatibilities) among them. In this paper, we focus on the incompatibilities that emerge due to resources…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
Rank aggregation with pairwise comparisons is widely encountered in sociology, politics, economics, psychology, sports, etc . Given the enormous social impact and the consequent incentives, the potential adversary has a strong motivation to…
We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting that models the assignment of papers to reviewers. A recurring issue in allocation problems is the compatibility of welfare/efficiency and fairness. Given an oracle to find a…
Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has been suggested to let agents submit partial…
We study critical systems that allocate scarce resources to satisfy basic needs, such as homeless services that provide housing. These systems often support communities disproportionately affected by systemic racial, gender, or other…
Allocating indivisible items among a set of agents is a frequently studied discrete optimization problem. In the setting considered in this work, the agents' preferences over the items are assumed to be identical. We consider a very recent…
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a…
The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategic setting, where the states of the tasks and resources are…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items to agents that have arbitrary entitlements to the items. Every agent $i$ has a valuation function $v_i$ and an entitlement $b_i$, where entitlements sum up to~1. Which…
We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using {\em Proportional Fairness} as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents while incentivizing…
Allocation tasks represent a class of problems where a limited amount of resources must be allocated to a set of entities at each time step. Prominent examples of this task include portfolio optimization or distributing computational…
In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism - a symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced mechanism. Our mechanism allocates the object to the highest valued agent…
In the problem of allocating a single non-disposable commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we study a weakening of strategy-proofness called not obvious manipulability (NOM). If agents are cognitively limited, then NOM…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
Many policies allocate harms or benefits that are uncertain in nature: they produce distributions over the population in which individuals have different probabilities of incurring harm or benefit. Comparing different policies thus involves…
While many production-ready and robust algorithms are available for the task of recommendation systems, many of these systems do not take the order of user's consumption into account. The order of consumption can be very useful and matters…
It is often beneficial for agents to pool their resources in order to better accommodate fluctuations in individual demand. Many multi-round resource allocation mechanisms operate in an online manner: in each round, the agents specify their…