Related papers: Zero-sum stopping games with asymmetric informatio…
We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the information of the players and on the mode of interaction between them. On the basis of information the classification is as follows: (a)…
Games, in their mathematical sense, are everywhere (game industries, economics, defense, education, chemistry, biology, ...).Search algorithms in games are artificial intelligence methods for playing such games. Unfortunately, there is no…
We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has more information on the game than his opponent. We show how to construct numerical schemes for the value function of this game, which is given…
The paper is concerned with a zero-sum continuous-time stochastic differential game with a dynamics controlled by a Markov process and a terminal payoff. The value function of the original game is estimated using the value function of a…
We consider the game-theoretic approach to time-inconsistent stopping of a one-dimensional diffusion where the time-inconsistency is due to the presence of a non-exponential (weighted) discount function. In particular, we study (weak)…
This paper introduces alignment games, a new class of zero-sum games modeling strategic interventions where effectiveness depends on alignment with an underlying hidden state. Motivated by operational problems in medical diagnostics,…
Mean-payoff games on timed automata are played on the infinite weighted graph of configurations of priced timed automata between two players, Player Min and Player Max, by moving a token along the states of the graph to form an infinite…
We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium…
In the paper we present a model of discrete-time mean-field game with several populations of players. Mean-field games with multiple populations of the players have only been studied in the literature in the continuous-time setting. The…
Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…
We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum…
We investigate the existence of certain types of equilibria (Nash, $\varepsilon$-Nash, subgame perfect, $\varepsilon$-subgame perfect, Pareto-optimal) in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games. We use two fundamental…
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…
In this paper, we consider two-player zero-sum matrix and stochastic games and develop learning dynamics that are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. Specifically, the learning dynamics for matrix…
An aperiodic and irreducible Markov chain on a finite state space converges to its stationary distribution. When convergence to equilibrium is measured by total variation distance, there exists an optimal coupling and a maximal coupling…
We consider a finite-horizon, zero-sum game in which both players control a stochastic differential equation by invoking impulses. We derive a control randomization formulation of the game and use the existence of a value for the randomized…
We introduce a zero-sum game problem of mean-field type as an extension of the classical zero-sum Dynkin game problem to the case where the payoff processes might depend on the value of the game and its probability law. We establish…
We study a class of zero-sum games between a singular-controller and a stopper over finite-time horizon. The underlying process is a multi-dimensional (locally non-degenerate) controlled stochastic differential equation (SDE) evolving in an…
In this work we consider an agent based model in order to study the wealth distribution problem where the interchange is determined with a symmetric zero sum game. Simultaneously, the agents update their way of play trying to learn the…
We introduce and study a two-player zero-sum game between a probabilist and Nature defined by a convex function $f$, a finite collection $\mathcal{B}$ of Markov generators (or its convex hull), and a target distribution $\pi$. The…