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Research regarding the stable marriage and roommate problem has a long and distinguished history in mathematics, computer science and economics. Stability in this context is predominantly core stability or one of its variants in which each…
In this paper, we demonstrate that in many NP-complete variants of the stable matching problem, such as the Stable Hypergraph Matching problem, the Stable Multicommodity Flow problem, and the College Admission problem with common quotas, a…
The stable marriage problem requires one to find a marriage with no blocking pair. Given a matching that is not stable, Roth and Vande Vate have shown that there exists a sequence of matchings that leads to a stable matching in which each…
We prove the three candidate Plurality is Stablest Conjecture of Khot-Kindler-Mossel-O'Donnell from 2005 for correlations $\rho$ satisfying $-1/43<\rho<1/10$: the Plurality function is the most noise stable three candidate election method…
In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main…
We present a polynomial-time $\frac{3}{2}$-approximation algorithm for the problem of finding a maximum-cardinality stable matching in a many-to-many matching model with ties and laminar constraints on both sides. We formulate our problem…
Given a satisfiable instance of 1-in-3 SAT, it is NP-hard to find a satisfying assignment for it, but it may be possible to efficiently find a solution subject to a weaker (not necessarily Boolean) predicate than `1-in-3'. There is a…
Many practical problems in almost all scientific and technological disciplines have been classified as computationally hard (NP-hard or even NP-complete). In life sciences, combinatorial optimization problems frequently arise in molecular…
One of the driving problems in the CSP area is the Dichotomy Conjecture, formulated in 1993 by Feder and Vardi [STOC'93], stating that for any fixed relational structure G the Constraint Satisfaction Problem CSP(G) is either NP--complete or…
We investigate the complexity of approximately counting stable matchings in the $k$-attribute model, where the preference lists are determined by dot products of "preference vectors" with "attribute vectors", or by Euclidean distances…
A super-stable matching, which was introduced by Irving, is a solution concept in a variant of the stable matching problem in which the preferences may contain ties. Irving proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of finding a…
We initiate the study of external manipulations in Stable Marriage by considering several manipulative actions as well as several manipulation goals. For instance, one goal is to make sure that a given pair of agents is matched in a stable…
In the Stable Marriage problem. when the preference lists are complete, all agents of the smaller side can be matched. However, this need not be true when preference lists are incomplete. In most real-life situations, where agents…
This paper presents a new combinatorial optimisation task, the Subset Sum Matching Problem (SSMP), which is an abstraction of common financial applications such as trades reconciliation. We present three algorithms, two suboptimal and one…
Given a set of $n$ men represented by $n$ points lying on a line, and $n$ women represented by $n$ points lying on another parallel line, with each person having a list that ranks some people of opposite gender as his/her acceptable…
While 3-SAT is NP-hard, 2-SAT is solvable in polynomial time. Austrin, Guruswami, and H\r{a}stad roved a result known as "$(2+\varepsilon)$-SAT is NP-hard" [FOCS'14/SICOMP'17]. They showed that the problem of distinguishing k-CNF formulas…
We consider the parity variants of basic problems studied in fine-grained complexity. We show that finding the exact solution is just as hard as finding its parity (i.e. if the solution is even or odd) for a large number of classical…
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…
In this article we study the stable marriage game induced by the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. Our setting is standard: all the lists are complete and the matching mechanism is the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. It is well…
While the stable marriage problem and its variants model a vast range of matching markets, they fail to capture complex agent relationships, such as the affiliation of applicants and employers in an interview marketplace. To model this…