Related papers: Stable marriage and roommates problems with restri…
We study the Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorces (DivorceSM) problem of deciding, given a Stable Marriage instance and an initial matching $M$ , whether there exists a stable matching which is reachable from $M$ by divorce operations as…
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to…
This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though…
We study the problem of finding solutions to the stable matching problem that are robust to errors in the input and we obtain a polynomial time algorithm for a special class of errors. In the process, we also initiate work on a new…
Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address this by proposing "incrementalized versions" of Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates. That is, we try to answer the following question: for…
We apply Lattice-Linear Predicate Detection Technique to derive parallel and distributed algorithms for various variants of the stable matching problem. These problems are: (a) the constrained stable marriage problem (b) the super stable…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
We present an n-ary constraint for the stable marriage problem. This constraint acts between two sets of integer variables where the domains of those variables represent preferences. Our constraint enforces stability and disallows bigamy.…
The Balanced Stable Marriage problem is a central optimization version of the classic Stable Marriage problem. Here, the output cannot be an arbitrary stable matching, but one that balances between the dissatisfaction of the two parties,…
Assume that $n = 2k$ potential roommates each have an ordered preference of the $n-1$ others. A stable matching is a perfect matching of the $n$ roommates in which no two unmatched people prefer each other to their matched partners. In…
We study the notion of robustness in stable matching problems. We first define robustness by introducing (a,b)-supermatches. An $(a,b)$-supermatch is a stable matching in which if $a$ pairs break up it is possible to find another stable…
We study the graphs formed from instances of the stable matching problem by connecting pairs of elements with an edge when there exists a stable matching in which they are matched. Our results include the NP-completeness of recognizing…
While the stable marriage problem and its variants model a vast range of matching markets, they fail to capture complex agent relationships, such as the affiliation of applicants and employers in an interview marketplace. To model this…
In a multiple partners matching problem the agents can have multiple partners up to their capacities. In this paper we consider both the two-sided many-to-many stable matching problem and the one-sided stable fixtures problem under…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
We consider Stable Marriage with Covering Constraints (SMC): in this variant of Stable Marriage, we distinguish a subset of women as well as a subset of men, and we seek a matching with fewest number of blocking pairs that matches all of…
Research regarding the stable marriage and roommate problem has a long and distinguished history in mathematics, computer science and economics. Stability in this context is predominantly core stability or one of its variants in which each…
The stable marriage problem requires one to find a marriage with no blocking pair. Given a matching that is not stable, Roth and Vande Vate have shown that there exists a sequence of matchings that leads to a stable matching in which each…
In many matching markets--such as athlete recruitment or academic admissions--participants on one side are evaluated by attribute vectors known to the other side, which in turn applies individual \emph{salience vectors} to assign relative…
Since the early days of research in algorithms and complexity, the computation of stable matchings is a core topic. While in the classic setting the goal is to match up two agents (either from different "gender" (this is Stable Marriage) or…