Related papers: Recursive Inspection Games

We consider a computing system where a master processor assigns tasks for execution to worker processors through the Internet. We model the workers decision of whether to comply (compute the task) or not (return a bogus result to save the…

We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…

In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…

Simple stochastic games can be solved by value iteration (VI), which yields a sequence of under-approximations of the value of the game. This sequence is guaranteed to converge to the value only in the limit. Since no stopping criterion is…

We study multi-player games with perfect information and general payoff function, where the set of stages is the set of non-positive integers $\{\ldots,-2,-1,0\}$. We define two related equilibrium concepts: one considering only deviations…

We prove that every repeated game with countably many players, finite action sets, and tail-measurable payoffs admits an $\epsilon$-equilibrium, for every $\epsilon > 0$.

We study discounted infinitely repeated games in which players agree on a cooperative mixed action profile but, at each step, observe only the realized pure actions. This form of imperfect monitoring breaks classical trigger strategies,…

Optimization under uncertainty is a fundamental problem in learning and decision-making, particularly in multi-agent systems. Previously, Feldman, Kalai, and Tennenholtz [2010] demonstrated the ability to efficiently compete in repeated…

We consider the problem in which n items arrive to a market sequentially over time, where two agents compete to choose the best possible item. When an agent selects an item, he leaves the market and obtains a payoff given by the value of…

The Pandora's Box problem models the search for the best alternative when evaluation is costly. In the simplest variant, a decision maker is presented with $n$ boxes, each associated with a cost of inspection and a hidden random reward. The…

We consider a repeated sequential game between a learner, who plays first, and an opponent who responds to the chosen action. We seek to design strategies for the learner to successfully interact with the opponent. While most previous…

We consider the best-arm identification problem in multi-armed bandits, which focuses purely on exploration. A player is given a fixed budget to explore a finite set of arms, and the rewards of each arm are drawn independently from a fixed,…

We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to…

Consider a 2-player normal-form game repeated over time. We introduce an adaptive learning procedure, where the players only observe their own realized payoff at each stage. We assume that agents do not know their own payoff function, and…

One of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding it. We study the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most stringent form of social dilemma, namely the Prisoner's Dilemma. Specifically, for a…

We study a simple motion differential game of many pursuers and one evader in the plane. We give a nonempty closed convex set in the plane, and the pursuers and evader move on this set. They cannot leave this set during the game. Control…

Repeated quantum game theory addresses long term relations among players who choose quantum strategies. In the conventional quantum game theory, single round quantum games or at most finitely repeated games have been widely studied, however…

Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents' long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly…

We consider discrete time partially observable zero-sum stochastic game with average payoff criterion. We study the game using an equivalent completely observable game. We show that the game has a value and also we come up with a pair of…

Originating in evolutionary game theory, the class of "zero-determinant" strategies enables a player to unilaterally enforce linear payoff relationships in simple repeated games. An upshot of this kind of payoff constraint is that it can…