Related papers: A game with divisors and absolute differences of e…

We introduce a game on graphs. By a theorem of Zermelo, each instance of the game on a finite graph is determined. While the general decision problem on which player has a winning strategy in a given instance of the game is unsolved, we…

We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player…

We show equivalences between several high-dimensional problems in extremal combinatorics and parallel repetition of multiplayer (multiprover) games over large answer alphabets. This extends the forbidden-subgraph technique, previously…

Under what conditions do the behaviors of players, who play a game repeatedly, converge to a Nash equilibrium? If one assumes that the players' behavior is a discrete-time or continuous-time rule whereby the current mixed strategy profile…

Population games model the evolution of strategic interactions among a large number of uniform agents. Due to the agents' uniformity and quantity, their aggregate strategic choices can be approximated by the solutions of a class of ordinary…

It is the purpose of this thesis to enunciate and prove a collection of explicit results in the theory of prime numbers. First, the problem of primes in short intervals is considered. We prove that there is a prime between consecutive cubes…

We study a random game in which two players in turn play a fixed number of moves. For each move, there are two possible choices. To each possible outcome of the game we assign a winner in an i.i.d. fashion with a fixed parameter p. In the…

We consider evolutionary dynamics for population games in which players have a continuum of strategies at their disposal. Models in this setting amount to infinite-dimensional differential equations evolving on the manifold of probability…

We investigate further several properties of the minority game we have recently introduced. We explain the origin of the phase transition and give an analytical expression of $\sigma^2/N$ in the $N\ll2^M$ region. The ability of the players…

Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…

Bidding chess is a chess variant where instead of alternating play, players bid for the opportunity to move. Generalizing a known result on so-called Richman games, we show that for a natural class of games including bidding chess, each…

We establish the existence and uniqueness of distributed equilibria to possibly nonsymmetric $N$ player differential games with interactions through controls under displacement semimonotonicity assumptions. Surprisingly, the nonseparable…

We study a finite-horizon differential game of pursuit-evasion like, between a single player and a mass of agents. The player and the mass directly control their own evolution, which for the mass is given by a first order PDE of transport…

We consider an integro-differential model for evolutionary game theory which describes the evolution of a population adopting mixed strategies. Using a reformulation based on the first moments of the solution, we prove some analytical…

Absolute Universes of combinatorial games, as defined in a recent paper by the same authors, include many standard short normal- mis\`ere- and scoring-play monoids. In this note we show that the class is categorical, by extending Joyal's…

We look at a class of transcendental real numbers xi which, together with their square, satisfy some extremal property of simultaneous approximation by rational numbers with the same denominator. We give a sufficient condition for such a…

In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to heterogeneity in…

Escalation is the fact that in a game (for instance in an auction), the agents play forever. The $0,1$-game is an extremely simple infinite game with intelligent agents in which escalation arises. It shows at the light of research on…

We introduce a new formulation of asset trading games in continuous time in the framework of the game-theoretic probability established by Shafer and Vovk (Probability and Finance: It's Only a Game! (2001) Wiley). In our formulation, the…

The maximal number of totally mixed Nash equilibria in games of several players equals the number of block derangements, as proved by McKelvey and McLennan.On the other hand, counting the derangements is a well studied problem. The numbers…