Related papers: Discussion of "On the Birnbaum Argument for the St…
The paper by Mayo claims to provide a new clarification and critique of Birnbaum's argument for showing that sufficiency and conditionality principles imply the likelihood principle. However, much of the arguments go back to arguments made…
This is an invited contribution to the discussion on Professor Deborah Mayo's paper, "On the Birnbaum argument for the strong likelihood principle," to appear in Statistical Science. Mayo clearly demonstrates that statistical methods…
Discussion of "On the Birnbaum Argument for the Strong Likelihood Principle" by Deborah G. Mayo [arXiv:1302.7021].
Rejoinder of "On the Birnbaum Argument for the Strong Likelihood Principle" by Deborah G. Mayo [arXiv:1302.7021].
We discuss Birnbaum's result, its relevance to statistical reasoning, Mayo's objections and the result in [Electron. J. Statist. 7 (2013) 2645-2655] that the proof of this result doesn't establish what is commonly believed.…
Birnbaum's theorem, that the sufficiency and conditionality principles entail the likelihood principle, has engendered a great deal of controversy and discussion since the publication of the result in 1962. In particular, many have raised…
The likelihood principle makes strong claims about the nature of statistical evidence but is controversial. Its claims are undermined by the existence of several examples that are assumed to show that it allows, with unity probability,…
In this discussion we demonstrate that fiducial distributions provide a natural example of an inference paradigm that does not obey Strong Likelihood Principle while still satisfying the Weak Conditionality Principle. [arXiv:1302.7021]
In this note, we provide critical commentary on two articles that cast doubt on the validity and implications of Birnbaum's theorem: Evans (2013) and Mayo (2014). In our view, the proof is correct and the consequences of the theorem are…
An essential component of inference based on familiar frequentist notions, such as $p$-values, significance and confidence levels, is the relevant sampling distribution. This feature results in violations of a principle known as the strong…
Probability theory as extended logic is completed such that essentially any probability may be determined. This is done by considering propositional logic (as opposed to predicate logic) as syntactically suffcient and imposing a symmetry…
Possibility theory offers a framework where both Lehmann's "preferential inference" and the more productive (but less cautious) "rational closure inference" can be represented. However, there are situations where the second inference does…
Many writers have observed that default logics appear to contain the "lottery paradox" of probability theory. This arises when a default "proof by contradiction" lets us conclude that a typical X is not a Y where Y is an unusual subclass of…
A number of well-known theorems, such as Cox's theorem and de Finetti's theorem. prove that any model of reasoning with uncertain information that satisfies specified conditions of "rationality" must satisfy the axioms of probability…
The combination of evidence in Dempster-Shafer theory is compared with the combination of evidence in probabilistic logic. Sufficient conditions are stated for these two methods to agree. It is then shown that these conditions are minimal…
This paper presents a plausible reasoning system to illustrate some broad issues in knowledge representation: dualities between different reasoning forms, the difficulty of unifying complementary reasoning styles, and the approximate nature…
We study the principle phi implies box phi, known as `Strength' or `the Completeness Principle', over the constructive version of L\"ob's Logic. We consider this principle both for the modal language with the necessity operator and for the…
It is well-known that Choice and Regularity are independent of each other but have important common consequences of logical character (reflection principles, representations of classes by sets, etc.). We explain this phenomenon by isolating…
The language of probability is used to define several different types of conditional statements. There are four principal types: subjunctive, material, existential, and feasibility. Two further types of conditionals are defined using the…
In this paper a conditional logic is defined and studied. This conditional logic, Deterministic Bayesian Logic, is constructed as a deterministic counterpart to the (probabilistic) Bayesian conditional. The logic is unrestricted, so that…