Related papers: Approachability in Stackelberg Stochastic Games wi…

Adversarial regularization has been shown to improve the generalization performance of deep learning models in various natural language processing tasks. Existing works usually formulate the method as a zero-sum game, which is solved by…

The increasing prevalence of multi-agent learning systems in society necessitates understanding how to learn effective and safe policies in general-sum multi-agent environments against a variety of opponents, including self-play.…

This study focuses on reachability problems in differential games. An improved level set method for computing reachable tubes is proposed in this paper. The reachable tube is described as a sublevel set of a value function, which is the…

Stackelberg Games are gaining importance in the last years due to the raise of Adversarial Machine Learning (AML). Within this context, a new paradigm must be faced: in classical game theory, intervening agents were humans whose decisions…

Studying continuous time counterpart of some discrete time dynamics is now a standard and fruitful technique, as some properties hold in both setups. In game theory, this is usually done by considering differential games on Euclidean…

In statistical decision theory involving a single decision-maker, an information structure is said to be better than another one if for any cost function involving a hidden state variable and an action variable which is restricted to be…

We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of the game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…

We study a Stackelberg game to examine how two agents determine to cooperate while competing with each other. Each selects an arrival time to a destination, the earlier one fetching a higher reward. There is, however, an inherent penalty in…

In this paper, we study the framework of two-player Stackelberg games played on graphs in which Player 0 announces a strategy and Player 1 responds rationally with a strategy that is an optimal response. While it is usually assumed that…

Commitments play a crucial role in game theory, shaping strategic interactions by either altering a player's own payoffs or influencing the incentives of others through outcome-contingent payments. While most research has focused on using…

Quantitative games are two-player zero-sum games played on directed weighted graphs. Total-payoff games (that can be seen as a refinement of the well-studied mean-payoff games) are the variant where the payoff of a play is computed as the…

This paper is an attempt to compute the value and saddle points of zero-sum risk-sensitive average stochastic games. For the average games with finite states and actions, we first introduce the so-called irreducibility coefficient and then…

Learning in games provides a powerful framework to design control policies for self-interested agents that may be coupled through their dynamics, costs, or constraints. We consider the case where the dynamics of the coupled system can be…

This paper investigates properties of Blackwell $\epsilon$-optimal strategies in zero-sum stochastic games when the adversary is restricted to stationary strategies, motivated by applications to robust Markov decision processes. For a class…

This paper presents a new solution concept for multiplayer stochastic games, namely, acceptable strategy profiles. For each player $i$ and state $s$ in a stochastic game, let $w_i(s)$ be a real number. A strategy profile is…

This paper investigates the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. In the class of games we consider, there is a hierarchical game being played between a leader and a follower with continuous action spaces. We establish a…

We consider the problem of learning to exploit learning algorithms through repeated interactions in games. Specifically, we focus on the case of repeated two player, finite-action games, in which an optimizer aims to steer a no-regret…

Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm…

The Stackelberg game model, where a leader commits to a strategy and the follower best responds, has found widespread application, particularly to security problems. In the security setting, the goal is for the leader to compute an optimal…

We study countably infinite stochastic 2-player games with reachability objectives. Our results provide a complete picture of the memory requirements of $\varepsilon$-optimal (resp. optimal) strategies. These results depend on the size of…