Related papers: Cycling in stochastic general equilibrium
We investigate the dynamics of Q-learning in a class of generalized Braess paradox games. These games represent an important class of network routing games where the associated stage-game Nash equilibria do not constitute social optima. We…
Simple binary-state coordination models are widely used to study collective socio-economic phenomena such as the spread of innovations or the adoption of products on social networks. The common trait of these systems is the occurrence of…
We study long-range interacting systems driven by external stochastic forces that act collectively on all the particles constituting the system. Such a scenario is frequently encountered in the context of plasmas, self-gravitating systems,…
We consider coalition formation among players in an n-player finite strategic game over infinite horizon. At each time a randomly formed coalition makes a joint deviation from a current action profile such that at new action profile all…
We study a class of games which model the competition among agents to access some service provided by distributed service units and which exhibit congestion and frustration phenomena when service units have limited capacity. We propose a…
TASP (Time Average Shapley Polygon, Bena{\=\i}m, Hofbauer and Hopkins, \emph{Journal of Economic Theory}, 2009), as a novel evolutionary dynamics model, predicts that a game could converge to cycles instead of fix points (Nash equilibria).…
Nonequilibrium statistical mechanics exhibit a variety of complex phenomena far from equilibrium. It inherits challenges of equilibrium, including accurately describing the joint distribution of a large number of configurations, and also…
There is a whole range of emergent phenomena in non-equilibrium behaviors can be well described by a set of stochastic differential equations. Inspired by an insight gained during our study of robustness and stability in phage lambda…
This paper integrates the damped harmonic oscillator into DSGE models to better capture delayed economic adjustments. By introducing a damping coefficient, I model economic recoveries as under-damped, critically damped, or over-damped…
We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…
In order to better understand the impact of environmental stochastic fluctuations on the evolution of animal behavior, we introduce the concept of a stochastic Nash equilibrium (SNE) that extends the classical concept of a Nash equilibrium…
Recent theories from complexity science argue that complex dynamics are ubiquitous in social and economic systems. These claims emerge from the analysis of individually simple agents whose collective behavior is surprisingly complicated.…
This paper investigates online stochastic aggregative games subject to local set constraints and time-varying coupled inequality constraints, where each player possesses a time-varying expectation-valued cost function relying on not only…
We analyze the stability of a nonlinear dynamical model describing the noncooperative strategic interactions among the agents of a finite collection of populations. Each agent selects one strategy at a time and revises it repeatedly…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
This paper considers a class of reinforcement-learning that belongs to the family of Learning Automata and provides a stochastic-stability analysis in strategic-form games. For this class of dynamics, convergence to pure Nash equilibria has…
The theory of learning in games has extensively studied situations where agents respond dynamically to each other by optimizing a fixed utility function. However, in real situations, the strategic environment varies as a result of past…
We consider generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with non-convex strategy spaces and non-convex cost functions. This general class of games includes the important case of games with mixed-integer variables for which only a few…
This paper introduces an equilibrium framework based on sequential sampling in which players face strategic uncertainty over their opponents' behavior and acquire informative signals to resolve it. Sequential sampling equilibrium delivers a…
This paper introduces a new method to achieve stable convergence to Nash equilibrium in duopoly noncooperative games. Inspired by the recent fixed-time Nash Equilibrium seeking (NES) as well as prescribed-time extremum seeking (ES) and…