Related papers: Coevolutionary success-driven multigames
Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of resources, defectors demand more than their supposed share for a higher payoff. To avoid the…
Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game is studied where initially all players are linked via a regular graph, having four neighbors each. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players are allowed to make new…
Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as…
Traditionally, resource limitation in evolutionary game theory is assumed just to impose a constant population size. Here we show that resource limitations may generate dynamical payoffs able to alter an original prisoner's dilemma, and to…
We study the cooperation problem in the framework of evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. Considering the growing process of the system and individuals with imitation capacity, we show conditions…
According to the standard imitation protocol, a less successful player adopts the strategy of the more successful one faithfully for future success. This is the cornerstone of evolutionary game theory that explores the vitality of competing…
In human societies the probability of strategy adoption from a given person may be affected by the personal features. Now we investigate how an artificially imposed restricted ability to reproduce, overruling ones fitness, affects an…
An active participation of players in evolutionary games depends on several factors, ranging from personal stakes to the properties of the interaction network. Diverse activity patterns thus have to be taken into account when studying the…
Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I…
We consider two-player iterated survival games in which players may switch from a more cooperative behavior to a less cooperative one at some step of the game. Payoffs are survival probabilities and lone individuals have to finish the game…
Real social interactions occur on networks in which each individual is connected to some, but not all, of others. In social dilemma games with a fixed population size, heterogeneity in the number of contacts per player is known to promote…
Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and the public goods game is studied, where initially players belong to two independent structured populations. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players whose current utility…
While traditional game models often simplify interactions among agents as static, real-world social relationships are inherently dynamic, influenced by both immediate payoffs and alternative information. Motivated by this fact, we introduce…
According to the standard protocol of spatial public goods game, a cooperator player invests not only into his own game but also into the games organized by neighboring partners. In this work, we relax this assumption by allowing…
Partner selection is an important process in many social interactions, permitting individuals to decrease the risks associated with cooperation. In large populations, defectors may escape punishment by roving from partner to partner, but…
The complete cooperation and the complete defection are two typical strategies considered in evolutionary games in many previous works. However, in real life, strategies of individuals are full of variety rather than only two complete ones.…
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation…
Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection. Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out. However, spatial structure enables cooperators to survive through the…
One of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding it. We study the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most stringent form of social dilemma, namely the Prisoner's Dilemma. Specifically, for a…
Cooperation and defection are social traits whose evolutionary origin is still unresolved. Recent behavioral experiments with humans suggested that strategy changes are driven mainly by the individuals' expectations and not by imitation.…