Related papers: Privacy Games
Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so…
While pursuing better utility by discovering knowledge from the data, individual's privacy may be compromised during an analysis. To that end, differential privacy has been widely recognized as the state-of-the-art privacy notion. By…
We study price-discrimination games between buyers and a seller where privacy arises endogenously--that is, utility maximization yields equilibrium strategies where privacy occurs naturally. In this game, buyers with a high valuation for a…
Players (people, firms, states, etc.) have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior,…
Data collecting agents in large networks, such as the electric power system, need to share information (measurements) for estimating the system state in a distributed manner. However, privacy concerns may limit or prevent this exchange…
A game-theoretic model for analysing the effects of privacy on strategic communication between agents is devised. In the model, a sender wishes to provide an accurate measurement of the state to a receiver while also protecting its private…
An information theoretic privacy mechanism design problem for two scenarios is studied where the private data is either hidden or observable. In each scenario, privacy leakage constraints are considered using two different measures. In…
In traditional mechanism design, agents only care about the utility they derive from the outcome of the mechanism. We look at a richer model where agents also assign non-negative dis-utility to the information about their private types…
In repeated games, such as auctions, players rely on autonomous learning agents to choose their actions. We study settings in which players have their agents make monetary transfers to other agents during play at their own expense, in order…
We study an information theoretic privacy mechanism design problem for two scenarios where the private data is either observable or hidden. In each scenario, we first consider bounded mutual information as privacy leakage criterion, then we…
The design of privacy mechanisms for two scenarios is studied where the private data is hidden or observable. In the first scenario, an agent observes useful data $Y$, which is correlated with private data $X$, and wants to disclose the…
Privacy-aware multiagent systems must protect agents' sensitive data while simultaneously ensuring that agents accomplish their shared objectives. Towards this goal, we propose a framework to privatize inter-agent communications in…
This paper is a survey of recent work at the intersection of mechanism design and privacy. The connection is a natural one, but its study has been jump-started in recent years by the advent of differential privacy, which provides a…
We consider a collection of linear stochastic bandit problems, each modeling the random response of different agents to proposed interventions, coupled together by a global safety constraint. We assume a central coordinator must choose…
Markov decision processes often seek to maximize a reward function, but onlookers may infer reward functions by observing the states and actions of such systems, revealing sensitive information. Therefore, in this paper we introduce and…
The Keynesian Beauty Contest is a classical game in which strategic agents seek to both accurately guess the true state of the world as well as the average action of all agents. We study an augmentation of this game where agents are…
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on…
Traditional evolutionary game theory describes how certain strategy spreads throughout the system where individual player imitates the most successful strategy among its neighborhood. Accordingly, player doesn't have own authority to change…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classic research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then…
Language model (LM) agents that act on users' behalf for personal tasks (e.g., replying emails) can boost productivity, but are also susceptible to unintended privacy leakage risks. We present the first study on people's capacity to oversee…