Related papers: A Truthful Mechanism for the Generalized Assignmen…
We study the incremental knapsack problem, where one wishes to sequentially pack items into a knapsack whose capacity expands over a finite planning horizon, with the objective of maximizing time-averaged profits. While various…
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms…
This paper considers the problem of maximizing an expectation function over a finite set, or finite-arm bandit problem. We first propose a naive stochastic bandit algorithm for obtaining a probably approximately correct (PAC) solution to…
To address efficiency and design challenges in choice-based matching platforms, we introduce a two-sided assortment optimization framework under general choice preferences. The goal in this problem is to maximize the expected number of…
This paper considers an optimization problem for a dynamical system whose evolution depends on a collection of binary decision variables. We develop scalable approximation algorithms with provable suboptimality bounds to provide…
A central challenge in mechanism design is to develop truthful trade mechanisms that maximize the expected gains-from-trade (GFT) in two-sided markets with strategic agents. As achieving the full GFT is generally impossible, much of the…
The 0-1 knapsack problem is a well-known combinatorial optimisation problem. Approximation algorithms have been designed for solving it and they return provably good solutions within polynomial time. On the other hand, genetic algorithms…
We study the menu complexity of optimal and approximately-optimal auctions in the context of the "FedEx" problem, a so-called "one-and-a-half-dimensional" setting where a single bidder has both a value and a deadline for receiving an…
We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving reduction from truthfully maximizing \emph{any} objective under…
In many settings the power of truthful mechanisms is severely bounded. In this paper we use randomization to overcome this problem. In particular, we construct an FPTAS for multi-unit auctions that is truthful in expectation, whereas there…
We present algorithms for implementing local spectrum redistribution in wireless networks using a mechanism design approach. For example, in single-hop request scheduling, secondary users are modeled as rational agents that have private…
Bin packing is an algorithmic problem that arises in diverse applications such as remnant inventory systems, shipping logistics, and appointment scheduling. In its simplest variant, a sequence of $T$ items (e.g., orders for raw material,…
We initiate a systematic study of utilizing predictions to improve over approximation guarantees of classic algorithms, without increasing the running time. We propose a systematic method for a wide class of optimization problems that ask…
In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each request from secondary users has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. With the requests of secondary users and the reserve price of the primary user, our goal is to design…
We study a generalization of the knapsack problem with geometric and vector constraints. The input is a set of rectangular items, each with an associated profit and $d$ nonnegative weights ($d$-dimensional vector), and a square knapsack.…
We initiate the study of centralized algorithms for welfare-maximizing allocation of goods to buyers subject to average-value constraints. We show that this problem is NP-hard to approximate beyond a factor of $\frac{e}{e-1}$, and provide a…
We present a unified framework for designing and analyzing algorithms for online budgeted allocation problems (including online matching) and their generalization, the Online Generalized Assignment Problem (OnGAP). These problems have been…
We consider a selfish variant of the knapsack problem. In our version, the items are owned by agents, and each agent can misrepresent the set of items she owns---either by avoiding reporting some of them (understating), or by reporting…
We study the uniform $2$-dimensional vector multiple knapsack (2VMK) problem, a natural variant of multiple knapsack arising in real-world applications such as virtual machine placement. The input for 2VMK is a set of items, each associated…
In the budget-feasible allocation problem, a set of items with varied sizes and values are to be allocated to a group of agents. Each agent has a budget constraint on the total size of items she can receive. The goal is to compute a…