Related papers: Truthful Multi-unit Procurements with Budgets

We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the…

Algorithmic pricing is the computational problem that sellers (e.g., in supermarkets) face when trying to set prices for their items to maximize their profit in the presence of a known demand. Guruswami et al. (2005) propose this problem…

Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to marry computation and incentives, mainly by leveraging monetary transfers between designer and selfish agents involved. This is principally because in absence of money, very little can be done to…

We study online auction settings in which agents arrive and depart dynamically in a random (secretary) order, and each agent's private type consists of the agent's arrival and departure times, value and budget. We consider multi-unit…

In this paper we consider multidimensional mechanism design problem for selling discrete substitutable items to a group of buyers. Previous work on this problem mostly focus on stochastic description of valuations used by the seller.…

In markets such as digital advertising auctions, bidders want to maximize value rather than payoff. This is different to the utility functions typically assumed in auction theory and leads to different strategies and outcomes. We refer to…

We formalize a framework for coordinating funding and selecting projects, the costs of which are shared among agents with quasi-linear utility functions and individual budgets. Our model contains the classical discrete participatory…

This paper studies an open question in the warehouse problem where a merchant trading a commodity tries to find an optimal inventory-trading policy to decide on purchase and sale quantities during a fixed time horizon in order to maximize…

A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty…

We develop a novel mathematical programming approximation framework to tackle the stochastic knapsack problem. In this problem, the decision maker considers items for which either weights or values, or both, are random. The aim is to select…

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total…

Priced timed games (PTGs) are two-player zero-sum games played on the infinite graph of configurations of priced timed automata where two players take turns to choose transitions in order to optimize cost to reach target states. Bouyer et…

We consider a single buyer with a combinatorial preference that would like to purchase related products and services from different vendors, where each vendor supplies exactly one product. We study the general case where subsets of products…

We tackle the problem of learning equilibria in simulation-based games. In such games, the players' utility functions cannot be described analytically, as they are given through a black-box simulator that can be queried to obtain noisy…

In this paper, we study the stochastic unbounded min-knapsack problem ($\textbf{Min-SUKP}$). The ordinary unbounded min-knapsack problem states that: There are $n$ types of items, and there is an infinite number of items of each type. The…

We consider the maximization problem of monotone submodular functions under an uncertain knapsack constraint. Specifically, the problem is discussed in the situation that the knapsack capacity is not given explicitly and can be accessed…

In this paper, we show a tight approximation guarantee for budget-feasible mechanisms with an additive buyer. We propose a new simple randomized mechanism with approximation ratio of $2$, improving the previous best known result of $3$. Our…

The stochastic knapsack problem is the stochastic variant of the classical knapsack problem in which the algorithm designer is given a a knapsack with a given capacity and a collection of items where each item is associated with a profit…

We propose the study of computing the Shapley value for a new class of cooperative games that we call budgeted games, and investigate in particular knapsack budgeted games, a version modeled after the classical knapsack problem. In these…

This paper considers the hidden-action model of the principal-agent problem, in which a principal incentivizes an agent to work on a project using a contract. We investigate whether contracts with bounded payments are learnable and…