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We investigate optimal decision making under imperfect recall, that is, when an agent forgets information it once held before. An example is the absentminded driver game, as well as team games in which the members have limited communication…
This paper contributes a new class of games called spacetime games with perfect information. In spacetime games, the agents make decisions at various positions in Minkowski spacetime. Spacetime games can be seen as the least common…
In this paper, which is a continuation of the previously published discrete time paper we develop a theory for continuous time stochastic control problems which, in various ways, are time inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit a…
We study a general formulation of the classical two-player Dynkin game in a discrete time Markovian setting. We identify an appropriate class of mixed strategies -- \textit{Markovian randomized stopping times} -- in which players stop at…
Supermodular games find significant applications in a variety of models, especially in operations research and economic applications of noncooperative game theory, and feature pure strategy Nash equilibria characterized as fixed points of…
People, robots, and companies mostly divide time and effort among projects, and \defined{shared effort games} model people investing resources in public endeavors and sharing the generated values. In linear $\theta$ sharing (effort) games,…
We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…
We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of (pure Nash) equilibria is guaranteed by potential…
Evidence games study situations where a sender persuades a receiver by selectively disclosing hard evidence about an unknown state of the world. Evidence games often have multiple equilibria. Hart et al. (2017) propose to focus on…
Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…
In competitive multi-player interactions, simultaneous optimality is a key requirement for establishing strategic equilibria. This property is explicit when the game-theoretic equilibrium is the simultaneously optimal solution of coupled…
We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which they exploit to achieve a more profitable outcome. We improve…
In the context of simple finite-state discrete time systems, we introduce a generalization of mean field game solution, called correlated solution, which can be seen as the mean field game analogue of a correlated equilibrium. Our notion of…
We consider a two-player game of war of attrition under complete information. It is well-known that this class of games admits equilibria in pure, as well as mixed strategies, and much of the literature has focused on the latter. We show…
This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison across equilibria. An equilibrium is more persuasive than an…
We study the emergence of locally suboptimal behavior in finitely repeated games. Locally suboptimal behavior refers to players play suboptimally in some rounds of the repeated game (i.e., not maximizing their payoffs in those rounds) while…
This paper introduces constrained correlated equilibrium, a solution concept combining correlation and coupled constraints in finite non-cooperative games. In the general case of an arbitrary correlation device and coupled constraints in…
We introduce a new class of context dependent, incomplete information games to serve as structured prediction models for settings with significant strategic interactions. Our games map the input context to outcomes by first condensing the…
We develop the fictitious play algorithm in the context of the linear programming approach for mean field games of optimal stopping and mean field games with regular control and absorption. This algorithm allows to approximate the mean…
Congestion games constitute an important class of games in which computing an exact or even approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general {\sf PLS}-complete. We present a surprisingly simple polynomial-time algorithm that computes…