Related papers: Fast distributed almost stable marriages
In Constrained Correlation Clustering, the goal is to cluster a complete signed graph in a way that minimizes the number of negative edges inside clusters plus the number of positive edges between clusters, while respecting hard constraints…
The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik showed that every stable allocation is necessarily built on a…
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…
We describe a distributed randomized algorithm computing approximate distances and routes that approximate shortest paths. Let n denote the number of nodes in the graph, and let HD denote the hop diameter of the graph, i.e., the diameter of…
Random graph matching refers to recovering the underlying vertex correspondence between two random graphs with correlated edges; a prominent example is when the two random graphs are given by Erd\H{o}s-R\'{e}nyi graphs $G(n,\frac{d}{n})$.…
We provide a simple new randomized contraction approach to the global minimum cut problem for simple undirected graphs. The contractions exploit 2-out edge sampling from each vertex rather than the standard uniform edge sampling. We…
Algorithmic stability is a classical approach to understanding and analysis of the generalization error of learning algorithms. A notable weakness of most stability-based generalization bounds is that they hold only in expectation.…
We address the fundamental network design problem of constructing approximate minimum spanners. Our contributions are for the distributed setting, providing both algorithmic and hardness results. Our main hardness result shows that an…
We study the problem of reaching agreement in a synchronous distributed system by $n$ autonomous parties, when the communication links from/to faulty parties can omit messages. The faulty parties are selected and controlled by an adaptive,…
In this paper we study the two player randomized communication complexity of the sparse set disjointness and the exists-equal problems and give matching lower and upper bounds (up to constant factors) for any number of rounds for both of…
Shapley value is originally a concept in econometrics to fairly distribute both gains and costs to players in a coalition game. In the recent decades, its application has been extended to other areas such as marketing, engineering and…
While many distributed optimization algorithms have been proposed for solving smooth or convex problems over the networks, few of them can handle non-convex and non-smooth problems. Based on a proximal primal-dual approach, this paper…
The family of $(k,\ell)$-sparse graphs, introduced by Lorea, plays a central role in combinatorial optimization and has a wide range of applications, particularly in rigidity theory. A key algorithmic problem is to decide whether a given…
Randomized rumor spreading is a classical protocol to disseminate information across a network. At SODA 2008, a quasirandom version of this protocol was proposed and competitive bounds for its run-time were proven. This prompts the…
We present a fascinating model that has lately caught attention among physicists working in complexity related fields. Though it originated from mathematics and later from economics, the model is very enlightening in many aspects that we…
We study the message complexity of leader election in synchronous networks of diameter two. Our main contribution is a refined analysis of the randomized algorithm proposed by Chatterjee et al. [DC, 2020]. In their work, the authors…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…
We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences that…
In the Stable Marriage problem. when the preference lists are complete, all agents of the smaller side can be matched. However, this need not be true when preference lists are incomplete. In most real-life situations, where agents…
The classic Stable Roommates problem (which is the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marriage problem) asks whether there is a stable matching for a given set of agents, i.e. a partitioning of the agents into disjoint…