Related papers: A Semi-Decidable Procedure for Secrecy in Cryptogr…
In this paper, we enunciate the theorem of secrecy in tagged protocols using the theory of witness-functions and we run a formal analysis on a new tagged version of the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using this theorem. We discuss…
In this paper, we use the witness-functions to analyze cryptographic protocols for secrecy under nonempty equational theories. The witness-functions are safe metrics used to compute security. An analysis with a witness-function consists in…
Proving that a cryptographic protocol is correct for secrecy is a hard task. One of the strongest strategies to reach this goal is to show that it is increasing, which means that the security level of every single atomic message exchanged…
Witness functions have recently been introduced in cryptographic protocols' literature as a new powerful way to prove protocol correctness with respect to secrecy. In this paper, we extend them to the property of authentication. We show how…
In this paper, we show how practical the little theorem of witness functions is in detecting security flaws in some category of cryptographic protocols. We convey a formal analysis of the Needham-Schroeder symmetric-key protocol in the…
In this paper, we present a new formal method to analyze cryptographic protocols statically for the property of secrecy. It consists in inspecting the level of security of every component in the protocol and making sure that it does not…
Protocol narrations are widely used in security as semi-formal notations to specify conversations between roles. We define a translation from a protocol narration to the sequences of operations to be performed by each role. Unlike previous…
A computational secret-sharing scheme is a method that enables a dealer, that has a secret, to distribute this secret among a set of parties such that a "qualified" subset of parties can efficiently reconstruct the secret while any…
Machine learning on encrypted data has received a lot of attention thanks to recent breakthroughs in homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computation. It allows outsourcing computation to untrusted servers without sacrificing…
In this paper, we look at the property of secrecy through the growth of the protocol. Intuitively, an increasing protocol preserves the secret. For that, we need functions to estimate the security of messages. Here, we give relaxed…
The verification of security protocols is essential, in order to ensure the absence of potential attacks. However, verification results are only valid with respect to the assumptions under which the verification was performed. These…
In this tutorial, selected topics of cryptology and of computational complexity theory are presented. We give a brief overview of the history and the foundations of classical cryptography, and then move on to modern public-key cryptography.…
Automated verification has become an essential part in the security evaluation of cryptographic protocols. In this context privacy-type properties are often modelled by indistinguishability statements, expressed as behavioural equivalences…
Security protocols often use randomization to achieve probabilistic non-determinism. This non-determinism, in turn, is used in obfuscating the dependence of observable values on secret data. Since the correctness of security protocols is…
There is a large amount of work dedicated to the formal verification of security protocols. In this paper, we revisit and extend the NP-complete decision procedure for a bounded number of sessions. We use a, now standard, deducibility…
Cryptographic protocols aim at securing communications over insecure networks such as the Internet, where dishonest users may listen to communications and interfere with them. A secure communication has a different meaning depending on the…
In recent times, many protocols have been proposed to provide security for various information and communication systems. Such protocols must be tested for their functional correctness before they are used in practice. Application of formal…
We present a new technique for verifying correspondences in security protocols. In particular, correspondences can be used to formalize authentication. Our technique is fully automatic, it can handle an unbounded number of sessions of the…
In the symbolic verification of cryptographic protocols, a central problem is deciding whether a protocol admits an execution which leaks a designated secret to the malicious intruder. Rusinowitch & Turuani (2003) show that, when…
In the symbolic verification of cryptographic protocols, a central problem is deciding whether a protocol admits an execution which leaks a designated secret to the malicious intruder. Rusinowitch and Turuani (2003) show that, when…