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Human ecological success relies on our characteristic ability to flexibly self-organize into cooperative social groups, the most successful of which employ substantial specialization and division of labor. Unlike most other animals, humans…
Two mechanisms that have been used to study the evolution of cooperative behavior are altruistic punishment, in which cooperative individuals pay additional costs to punish defection, and multilevel selection, in which competition between…
We study a condition of favoring cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks. There are two kinds of players: cooperators and defectors. Cooperators pay a benefit b to their neighbors at a cost c, whereas defectors only…
We consider interactions between players in groups of size $d\geq2$ with payoffs that not only depend on the strategies used in the group but also fluctuate at random over time. An individual can adopt either cooperation or defection as…
When individuals interact in groups, the evolution of cooperation is traditionally modeled using the framework of public goods games. These models often assume that the return of the public good depends linearly on the fraction of…
Many mechanisms behind the evolution of cooperation, such as reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and altruistic punishment, require group knowledge of individual actions. But what keeps people cooperating when no one is looking? Conformist…
In the study of the evolution of cooperation, many mechanisms have been proposed to help overcome the self-interested cheating that is individually optimal in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. These mechanisms include assortative or networked…
This paper examines experimentally how reputational uncertainty and the rate of change of the social environment determine cooperation. Reputational uncertainty significantly decreases cooperation, while a fast-changing social environment…
Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the…
In spatial evolutionary games the fitness of each individual is traditionally determined by the payoffs it obtains upon playing the game with its neighbors. Since defection yields the highest individual benefits, the outlook for cooperators…
In many prediction problems, the predictive model affects the distribution of the prediction target. This phenomenon is known as performativity and is often caused by the behavior of individuals with vested interests in the outcome of the…
In this paper, the total payoff of each agent is regulated to reduce the heterogeneity of the distribution of the total payoffs. It is found there is an optimal regulation strength where the fraction of cooperation is prominently promoted,…
Indirect reciprocity based on reputation is a leading mechanism driving human cooperation, where monitoring of behaviour and sharing reputation-related information are crucial. Because collecting information is costly, a tragedy of the…
Cooperation underlies many natural and artificial systems. While voluntary participation can sustain cooperation without informational assumptions, real interactions are rarely anonymous, leaving the joint effects of participation and…
Indirect reciprocity is a major mechanism in the maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Indirect reciprocity leads to conditional cooperation according to social norms that discriminate the good (those who deserve to be…
Understanding the conditions for maintaining cooperation in groups of unrelated individuals despite the presence of non-cooperative members is a major research topic in contemporary biological, sociological, and economic theory. The…
The efficiency of institutionalized punishment is studied by evaluating the stationary states in the spatial public goods game comprising unconditional defectors, cooperators, and cooperating pool-punishers as the three competing…
Individual migration has been regarded as an important factor for the evolution of cooperation in mobile populations. Motivations of migration, however, can be largely divergent: one is highly frustrated by the vicinity of an exploiter or…
Actions such as sharing food and cooperating to reach a common goal have played a fundamental role in the evolution of human societies. These good actions may not maximise the actor's payoff, but they maximise the other's payoff.…
The public goods game is a broadly used paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. According to the basic assumption, the interaction graph determines the connections of a player where the focal actor…