Related papers: The Pricing War Continues: On Competitive Multi-It…
In this work we consider selling items using a sequential first price auction mechanism. We generalize the assumption of conservative bidding to extensive form games (henceforth optimistic conservative bidding), and show that for both…
The Ultimatum Game is conventionally formulated in the context of two players. Nonetheless, real-life scenarios often entail community interactions among numerous individuals. To address this, we introduce an extended version of the…
This paper considers the problem of inverse reinforcement learning in zero-sum stochastic games when expert demonstrations are known to be not optimal. Compared to previous works that decouple agents in the game by assuming optimality in…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
We apply Blackwell optimality to repeated games. An equilibrium whose strategy profile is sequentially rational for all high enough discount factors simultaneously is a Blackwell (subgame-perfect, perfect public, etc.) equilibrium. The bite…
In this paper, we consider microgrids that interconnect prosumers with distributed energy resources and dynamic loads. Prosumers are connected through the microgrid to trade energy and gain profit while respecting the network constraints.…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…
We study a networked economic system composed of $n$ producers supplying a single homogeneous good to a number of geographically separated markets and of a centralized authority, called the market maker. Producers compete \`a la Cournot, by…
We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…
A central question in algorithmic game theory is to measure the inefficiency (ratio of costs) of Nash equilibria (NE) with respect to socially optimal solutions. The two established metrics used for this purpose are price of anarchy (POA)…
This paper studies a nonzero-sum Dynkin game in discrete time under non-exponential discounting. For both players, there are two levels of game-theoretic reasoning intertwined. First, each player looks for an intra-personal equilibrium…
Subgame perfect equilibria are specific Nash equilibria in perfect information games in extensive form. They are important because they relate to the rationality of the players. They always exist in infinite games with continuous…
In classical job-scheduling games, each job behaves as a selfish player, choosing a machine to minimize its own completion time. To reduce the equilibria inefficiency, coordination mechanisms are employed, allowing each machine to follow…
In this paper, we delve into the problem of using monetary incentives to encourage players to shift from an initial Nash equilibrium to a more favorable one within a game. Our main focus revolves around computing the minimum reward required…
Even when confronted with the same data, agents often disagree on a model of the real-world. Here, we address the question of how interacting heterogenous agents, who disagree on what model the real-world follows, optimize their trading…
In this paper, we study the public procurement market through the lens of game theory by modeling it as a strategic game with discontinuous and non-quasiconcave payoffs. We first show that the game admits no Nash equilibrium in pure…
We consider the provision of public goods on networks of strategic agents. We study different effort outcomes of these network games, namely, the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles, and semi-cooperative equilibria (effort…
Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…
We formulate and study a two-player static duel game as a nonzero-sum discounted stochastic game. Players $P_{1},P_{2}$ are standing in place and, in each turn, one or both may shoot at the other player. If $P_{n}$ shoots at $P_{m}$ ($m\neq…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent's cost function depends on all agents' strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm to learn a Nash equilibrium, whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at…