Related papers: Solving Large Imperfect Information Games Using CF…
We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for…
Computing Nash equilibria of zero-sum games in classical and quantum settings is extensively studied. For general-sum games, computing Nash equilibria is PPAD-hard and the computing of a more general concept called correlated equilibria has…
We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…
We introduce a simple extensive-form algorithm for finding equilibria of two-player, zero-sum games. The algorithm is realization equivalent to a generalized form of Fictitious Play. We compare its performance to that of a similar…
Many efficient algorithms have been designed to recover Nash equilibria of various classes of finite games. Special classes of continuous games with infinite strategy spaces, such as polynomial games, can be solved by semidefinite…
Finding Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games remains a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Recent multi-round regularization methods offer a promising direction, yet existing approaches…
Adversarial team games model multiplayer strategic interactions in which a team of identically-interested players is competing against an adversarial player in a zero-sum game. Such games capture many well-studied settings in game theory,…
The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their…
Concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) are an ideal formalism for modelling probabilistic systems that feature multiple players or components with distinct objectives making concurrent, rational decisions. Examples include communication or…
Game theory finds nowadays a broad range of applications in engineering and machine learning. However, in a derivative-free, expensive black-box context, very few algorithmic solutions are available to find game equilibria. Here, we propose…
Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the canonical solution concept of game theory, which provides an elegant tool to understand the rationalities. Though mixed strategy NE exists in any game with finite players and actions, computing NE in two- or…
A fundamental shortcoming of the concept of Nash equilibrium is its computational intractability: approximating Nash equilibria in normal-form games is PPAD-hard. In this paper, inspired by the ideas of smoothed analysis, we introduce a…
In this paper we investigate the Follow the Regularized Leader dynamics in sequential imperfect information games (IIG). We generalize existing results of Poincar\'e recurrence from normal-form games to zero-sum two-player imperfect…
Extensive-form games provide a versatile framework for modeling interactions of multiple agents subjected to imperfect observations and stochastic events. In recent years, two paradigms, policy space response oracles (PSRO) and…
This paper investigates a class of games with large strategy spaces, motivated by challenges in AI alignment and language games. We introduce the hidden game problem, where for each player, an unknown subset of strategies consistently…
Continuous games are multiplayer games in which strategy sets are compact and utility functions are continuous. These games typically have a highly complicated structure of Nash equilibria, and numerical methods for the equilibrium…
We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…
Current fault-tolerant quantum compilers allocate error budgets uniformly during resource estimation, causing suboptimal physical resource overhead. We optimize this allocation using a potential game formulation, where Nash Equilibrium…
Solution concepts of traditional game theory assume entirely rational players; therefore, their ability to exploit subrational opponents is limited. One type of subrationality that describes human behavior well is the quantal response.…
Game contingent claims (GCCs) generalize American contingent claims by allowing the writer to recall the option as long as it is not exercised, at the price of paying some penalty. In incomplete markets, an appealing approach is to analyze…