Related papers: Approachability in Population Games
Graph games are fundamental in strategic reasoning of multi-agent systems and their environments. We study a new family of graph games which combine stochastic environmental uncertainties and auction-based interactions among the agents,…
We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
In this paper, we consider a mean field game model inspired by crowd motion in which several interacting populations evolving in $\mathbb R^d$ aim at reaching given target sets in minimal time. The movement of each agent is described by a…
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations provides a new framework to understand the selection of traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Recently, a simple but fundamental law of evolutionary dynamics, which we call {\sigma} law,…
We study evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. We analyze an evolutionary process, which we call pairwise comparison, for which we adopt the ubiquitous Fermi distribution function from statistical mechanics. The inverse…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
The design of coherent and efficient policies to address infectious diseases and their consequences requires to model not only epidemics dynamics, but also individual behaviors, as the latter has a strong influence on the former. In our…
The designs of many large-scale systems today, from traffic routing environments to smart grids, rely on game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, as the size of an $N$-player game typically grows exponentially with $N$, standard game…
We study the evolutionary dynamics of games under environmental feedback using replicator equations for two interacting populations. One key feature is to consider jointly the co-evolution of the dynamic payoff matrices and the state of the…
We consider an assignment problem that has aspects of fair division as well as social choice. In particular, we investigate the problem of assigning a small subset from a set of indivisible items to multiple players so that the chosen…
Evolutionary game theory has proven to be an elegant framework providing many fruitful insights in population dynamics and human behaviour. Here, we focus on the aspect of behavioural plasticity and its effect on the evolution of…
There has been substantial progress on finding game-theoretic equilibria. Most of that work has focused on games with finite, discrete action spaces. However, many games involving space, time, money, and other fine-grained quantities have…
Two-player quantitative zero-sum games provide a natural framework to synthesize controllers with performance guarantees for reactive systems within an uncontrollable environment. Classical settings include mean-payoff games, where the…
Evolutionary game theory is a common framework to study the evolution of cooperation, where it is usually assumed that the same game is played in all interactions. Here, we investigate a model where the game that is played by two…
The analysis of large population economies with incomplete information often entails the integration of a continuum of random variables. We showcase the usefulness of the integral notion \`a la Pettis (1938) to study such models. We present…
We introduce the notion of regularized Bayesian best response (RBBR) learning dynamic in heterogeneous population games. We obtain such a dynamic via perturbation by an arbitrary lower semicontinuous, strongly convex regularizer in Bayesian…
Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus. The…
The processes of interplant competition within a field are still poorly understood. However, they explain a large part of the heterogeneity in a field and may have longer-term consequences, especially in mixed stands. Modeling can help to…
Classic reachability games on graphs are zero-sum games, where the goal of one player, Eve, is to visit a vertex from a given target set, and that of other player, Adam, is to prevent this. Generalised reachability games, studied by…