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Designing optimal interdependent networks is important for the robustness and efficiency of national critical infrastructures. Here, we establish a two-person game-theoretic model in which two network designers choose to maximize the global…
We consider the problem of exploration of networks, some of whose edges are faulty. A mobile agent, situated at a starting node and unaware of which edges are faulty, has to explore the connected fault-free component of this node by…
In the problem of minimum connected dominating set with routing cost constraint, we are given a graph $G=(V,E)$, and the goal is to find the smallest connected dominating set $D$ of $G$ such that, for any two non-adjacent vertices $u$ and…
This technical note presents a leader-follower scheme for network aggregative games. The followers and leader are selfish cost minimizing agents. The cost function of each follower is affected by strategy of leader and aggregated strategies…
This paper provides a comprehensive convergence analysis of the PoA of both pure and mixed Nash equilibria in atomic congestion games with unsplittable demands.
We study a network formation game where nodes wish to send traffic to other nodes. Nodes can contract bilaterally other nodes to form bidirectional links as well as nodes can break unilaterally contracts to eliminate the corresponding…
We investigate the optimal design of networks for a general transport system. Our network is built from a regular two-dimensional ($d=2$) square lattice to be improved by adding long-range connections (shortcuts) with probability $P_{ij}…
In this paper, we consider the problem of network design on network games. We study the conditions on the adjacency matrix of the underlying network to design a game such that the Nash equilibrium coincides with the social optimum. We…
This paper examines the behavior of the price of anarchy as a function of the traffic inflow in nonatomic congestion games with multiple origin-destination (O/D) pairs. Empirical studies in real-world networks show that the price of anarchy…
This work presents a variation of Naor's strategic observable model (1969), by adding a component of customer heterogeneity induced by the location of customers in relation to the server. Accordingly, customers incur a travel cost which…
This paper shows that the PoA in non-atomic congestion games is H{\"o}lder continuous w.r.t. combined disturbance on cost functions and demands. We then apply this result to the convergence analysis of the PoA.
We study cost-sharing games in real-time scheduling systems where the activation cost of the server at any given time is a function of its load. We focus on monomial cost functions and consider both the case when the degree is less than one…
Network games are widely used as a model for selfish resource-allocation problems. In the classical model, each player selects a path connecting her source and target vertices. The cost of traversing an edge depends on the {\em load};…
Modern transformer attention is internally multi-agent -- heads compete and coordinate -- yet we train it as if it were a monolithic optimizer. We formalize this gap: cross-entropy training induces an implicit potential game among heads,…
In this paper we consider strategic cost sharing games with so-called arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems, such as vertex and set cover, facility location, and network design problems. We concentrate on…
This paper shows the existence of $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{n^\gamma})$-Nash equilibria in $n$-player noncooperative sum-aggregative games in which the players' cost functions, depending only on their own action and the average of all players'…
We analyze complexity in spatial network ensembles through the lens of graph entropy. Mathematically, we model a spatial network as a soft random geometric graph, i.e., a graph with two sources of randomness, namely nodes located randomly…
The price of anarchy, originally introduced to quantify the inefficiency of selfish behavior in routing games, is extended to mean field games. The price of anarchy is defined as the ratio of a worst case social cost computed for a mean…
We prove that every finite two-person shortest path game, where the local cost of every move is positive for each player, has a Nash equilibrium (NE) in pure stationary strategies, which can be computed in polynomial time. We also extend…
Network congestion games are a convenient model for reasoning about routing problems in a network: agents have to move from a source to a target vertex while avoiding congestion, measured as a cost depending on the number of players using…