Related papers: The Max-Distance Network Creation Game on General …
We introduce natural strategic games on graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in a local setting. We study the existence of equilibria that are resilient to coalitional deviations of unbounded and bounded size (i.e., strong…
Network Creation Games(NCGs) model the creation of decentralized communication networks like the Internet. In such games strategic agents corresponding to network nodes selfishly decide with whom to connect to optimize some objective…
In this study, we formulate positive and negative externalities caused by changes in the supply of shared vehicles as ride sharing games. The study aims to understand the price of anarchy (PoA) and its improvement via a coordination…
Today we rely on networks that are created and maintained by smart devices. For such networks, there is no governing central authority but instead the network structure is shaped by the decisions of selfish intelligent agents. A key…
In this work, we investigate an application of a Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm in a social network. In a networked game each player (user) takes action in response to other players' actions in order to decrease (increase) his cost…
How do rational agents self-organize when trying to connect to a common target? We study this question with a simple tree formation game which is related to the well-known fair single-source connection game by Anshelevich et al. (FOCS'04)…
In this paper, we consider the Shapley network design game on undirected networks. In this game, we have an edge weighted undirected network $G(V,E)$ and $n$ selfish players where player $i$ wants to choose a path from source vertex $s_i$…
We consider nonatomic network games with one source and one destination. We examine the asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy as the inflow increases. In accordance with some empirical observations, we show that, under suitable…
This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…
Algorithmic graph theory has thoroughly analyzed how, given a network describing constraints between various nodes, groups can be formed among these so that the resulting configuration optimizes a \emph{global} metric. In contrast, for…
Network Creation Games are an important framework for understanding the formation of real-world networks. These games usually assume a set of indistinguishable agents strategically buying edges at a uniform price leading to a network among…
We study the performance of approximate Nash equilibria for linear congestion games. We consider how much the price of anarchy worsens and how much the price of stability improves as a function of the approximation factor $\epsilon$. We…
In the context of networking, research has focused on non-cooperative games, where the selfish agents cannot reach a binding agreement on the way they would share the infrastructure. Many approaches have been proposed for mitigating the…
We give exponential lower bounds on the Price of Stability (PoS) of weighted congestion games with polynomial cost functions. In particular, for any positive integer $d$ we construct rather simple games with cost functions of degree at most…
In multicast network design games, a set of agents choose paths from their source locations to a common sink with the goal of minimizing their individual costs, where the cost of an edge is divided equally among the agents using it. Since…
We consider a game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential consumers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest…
We study social cost losses in Facility Location games, where $n$ selfish agents install facilities over a network and connect to them, so as to forward their local demand (expressed by a non-negative weight per agent). Agents using the…
In this paper, we study the distributed sketching complexity of connectivity. In distributed graph sketching, an $n$-node graph $G$ is distributed to $n$ players such that each player sees the neighborhood of one vertex. The players then…
In this paper we study quality measures of different solution concepts for the multicast network design game on a ring topology. We recall from the literature a lower bound of 4/3 and prove a matching upper bound for the price of stability,…
In the famous network creation game of Fabrikant et al. a set of agents play a game to build a connected graph. The $n$ agents form the vertex set $V$ of the graph and each vertex $v\in V$ buys a set $E_v$ of edges inducing a graph…