Related papers: Spatial Evolutionary Games with small selection co…
Replicator equation -- a paradigm equation in evolutionary game dynamics -- mathematizes the frequency dependent selection of competing strategies vying to enhance their fitness (quantified by the average payoffs) with respect to the…
We present a general framework to describe the evolutionary dynamics of an arbitrary number of types in finite populations based on stochastic differential equations (SDE). For large, but finite populations this allows to include…
The environment has a strong influence on a population's evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continual change in nature. To capture an ever-changing environment, we consider a…
We study the fragmentation-coagulation (or merging and splitting) evolutionary control model as introduced recently by one of the authors, where $N$ small players can form coalitions to resist to the pressure exerted by the principal. It is…
Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the…
Evolutionary game dynamics describes not only frequency dependent genetical evolution, but also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been shown that the details of strategy update…
We study the role of local effects and finite size effects in reaching coordination and in equilibrium selection in different types of two-player coordination games. We investigate three update rules -- the replicator dynamics (RD), the…
Players of coevolutionary games may update not only their strategies but also their networks of interaction. Based on interpreting the payoff of players as fitness, dynamic landscape models are proposed. The modeling procedure is carried…
In the original Evolutionary Minority Game, a segregation into two populations with opposing preferences is observed under many circumstances. We show that this segregation becomes more pronounced and more robust if the dynamics are changed…
Game-theoretic solution concepts, such as the Nash equilibrium, have been key to finding stable joint actions in multi-player games. However, it has been shown that the dynamics of agents' interactions, even in simple two-player games with…
The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away…
We analyze the influence of multiplayer interactions and network adaptation on the stability of equilibrium points in evolutionary games. We consider the Snowdrift game with both two-player and three-player interactions on simplicial…
We propose a simple model of network co-evolution in a game-dynamical system of interacting agents that play repeated games with their neighbors, and adapt their behaviors and network links based on the outcome of those games. The…
We consider (N,r) games of predation with N species and r < N prey and predators, acting in a cyclic way. Further basic reactions include reproduction, decay and diffusion over a regular grid, without a hard constraint on the occupation…
Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote…
Evolutionary game theory is a common framework to study the evolution of cooperation, where it is usually assumed that the same game is played in all interactions. Here, we investigate a model where the game that is played by two…
Over the past few decades, many works have studied the evolutionary dynamics of continuous games. However, previous works have primarily focused on two-player games with pairwise interactions. Indeed, group interactions rather than pairwise…
To investigate the origin of cooperative behaviors, we developed an evolutionary model of sequential strategies and tested our model with computer simulations. The sequential strategies represented by stochastic machines were evaluated…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…
Repeated interactions are ubiquitous and known to promote social behaviour. While research often focuses on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, experimental evidence suggests repeated interactions also foster fairness. This study…