Related papers: Moral Hazard in Dynamic Risk Management
We study the design of an optimal insurance contract in which the insured maximizes her expected utility and the insurer limits the variance of his risk exposure while maintaining the principle of indemnity and charging the premium…
We study the power of menus of contracts in principal-agent problems with adverse selection (agents can be one of several types) and moral hazard (we cannot observe agent actions directly). For principal-agent problems with $T$ types and…
We introduce a class of robust control problems formulated in min-max form, in which the principal agent is viewed as a central planner facing Nature. The agent's cost is a nonlinear function of all its possible realizations, encompassing…
Many real-life contractual relations differ completely from the clean, static model at the heart of principal-agent theory. Typically, they involve repeated strategic interactions of the principal and agent, taking place under uncertainty…
This paper studies contracting in the presence of externalities with a non-contractible outsider. Multiple equilibria arise from strategic symmetry between the insider agent and the outsider. To address strategic uncertainty, the principal…
We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. These are problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme in order to incentivize some agents to take costly, unobservable actions that lead…
We investigate the portfolio execution problem under a framework in which volatility and liquidity are both uncertain. In our model, we assume that a multidimensional Markovian stochastic factor drives both of them. Moreover, we model…
In this paper, we address three Principal--Agent problems in a moral hazard context and show that they are connected. We start by studying the problem of Principal with multiple Agents in cooperation. The term cooperation is manifested here…
De Finetti's optimal reinsurance is a set of contracts, one for each risk in a portfolio, that caps the retained aggregate variance to a pre-specified level while minimizing total expected loss. The premiums are determined using the…
The existence of optimal contracts of the principal-agent problem is a long-standing problem. According to the general framework in Cvitani\'c et al. [2], this existence can be derived from the existence of a classical solution to a…
We study the robust regulation of contracts in moral hazard problems. A firm offers a contract to incentivise a worker protected by limited liability. A regulator restricts the set of permissible contracts to (i) improve efficiency and (ii)…
In the combinatorial action model of contract design, a principal delegates a complex project to an agent, incentivizing a subset of actions from a ground set of $n$ actions, via a linear contract. Computing the optimal contract is a…
We consider discrete-time infinite horizon deterministic optimal control problems with nonnegative cost per stage, and a destination that is cost-free and absorbing. The classical linear-quadratic regulator problem is a special case. Our…
We study an optimal investment/consumption problem in a model capturing market and credit risk dependencies. Stochastic factors drive both the default intensity and the volatility of the stocks in the portfolio. We use the martingale…
In this paper, we consider a problem of contract theory in which several Principals hire a common Agent and we study the model in the continuous time setting. We show that optimal contracts should satisfy some equilibrium conditions and we…
Quadratic hedging of option payoffs generates the variance optimal martingale measure. When an option features an exercise policy and its cash flows are hedged according to this approach, it may be tempting to optimize such a policy under…
We study the fundamental problem of designing contracts in principal-agent problems under uncertainty. Previous works mostly addressed Bayesian settings in which principal's uncertainty is modeled as a probability distribution over agent's…
We study hidden-action principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme (called contract) so as to incentivize the agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. In…
This paper studies a Value-at-Risk (VaR)-regulated optimal portfolio problem of the equity holders of a participating life insurance contract. In a setting with unhedgeable mortality risk and complete financial market, the optimal solution…
Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) is a powerful tool for training autonomous agents acting independently in a common environment. However, it can lead to sub-optimal behavior when individual incentives and group incentives diverge.…