Related papers: Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of prac…
An eavesdropper Eve may probe a quantum key distribution (QKD) system by sending a bright pulse from the quantum channel into the system and analyzing the back-reflected pulses. Such Trojan-horse attacks can breach the security of the QKD…
We demonstrate the experimental feasibility of a Trojan-horse attack that remains nearly invisible to the single-photon detectors employed in practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, such as Clavis2 from ID Quantique. We perform a…
The discrete-variable QKD protocols based on BB84 are known to be secure against an eavesdropper, Eve, intercepting the flying qubits and performing any quantum operation on them. However, these protocols may still be vulnerable to…
Security analyses of quantum cryptographic protocols typically rely on certain conditions; one such condition is that the sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob) have isolated devices inaccessible to third parties. If an eavesdropper (Eve) has a…
In the quantum version of a Trojan-horse attack, photons are injected into the optical modules of a quantum key distribution system in an attempt to read information direct from the encoding devices. To stop the Trojan photons, the use of…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic technique that leverages principles of quantum mechanics to offer extremely high levels of data security during transmission. It is well acknowledged for its capacity to accomplish provable…
Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) disregard the effect of information leakage from the users' devices, and, thus, do not protect against Trojan-horse attacks (THAs). In a THA, the eavesdropper injects strong light into…
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) leverages the principles of quantum mechanics to exchange a secret key between two parties. Unlike classical cryptographic systems, the security of QKD is not reliant on computational assumptions but is…
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) leverages the principles of quantum mechanics to provide theoretically unconditional security for cryptographic key sharing. However, practical implementations remain vulnerable due to non-ideal devices and…
The security of quantum communication using a weak coherent source requires an accurate knowledge of the source's mean photon number. Finite calibration precision or an active manipulation by an attacker may cause the actual emitted photon…
We propose a quantum key distribution scheme by using screening angles and analyzing detectors which enable to notice the presence of Eve who eavesdrops the quantum channel, as the revised protocol of the recent quantum key distribution…
General Trojan horse attacks on quantum key distribution systems are analyzed. We illustrate the power of such attacks with today's technology and conclude that all system must implement active counter-measures. In particular all systems…
A new class of quantum cryptography (QC) protocols that are robust against the most general photon number splitting attacks in a weak coherent pulse implementation has been recently proposed. In this article we give a quite exhaustive…
In this article, we experimentally demonstrate an eavesdropper's (Eve's) information gain by exploiting the breakdown flash generated by the single photon avalanche detector (SPAD) used in coherent one-way quantum key distribution (COW-QKD)…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems can send signals over more than 100 km standard optical fiber and are widely believed to be secure. Here, we show experimentally for the first time a technologically feasible attack, namely the…
Cryptanalysis is an important branch in the study of cryptography, including both the classical cryptography and the quantum one. In this paper we analyze the security of two three-party quantum key distribution protocols (QKDPs) proposed…
In a quantum Trojan-horse attack (THA), eavesdroppers learn encoded information by injecting bright light into encoded or decoded devices of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. These attacks severely compromise the security of…
We present a method to control the detection events in quantum key distribution systems that use gated single-photon detectors. We employ bright pulses as faked states, timed to arrive at the avalanche photodiodes outside the activation…
We discuss the robustness of two-way quantum communication protocols against Trojan horse attack and introduce a novel attack, delay-photon Trojan horse attack. Moreover, we present a practical way for two-way quantum communication…
The security proofs of the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols make certain assumptions about the operations of physical systems. Thus, appropriate modelling of devices to ensure that their operations are consistent with the models…