Related papers: A Stable Marriage Requires Communication
In the Gale-Shapley model of two-sided matching, it is well known that for generic preferences, the outcomes for each side can vary dramatically in the male-optimal vs. female-optimal stable matchings. In this paper, we show that under a…
In stable matching, one must find a matching between two sets of agents, commonly men and women, or job applicants and job positions. Each agent has a preference ordering over who they want to be matched with. Moreover a matching is said to…
Given $n$ men, $n$ women, and $n$ dogs, each man has an incomplete preference list of women, each woman does an incomplete preference list of dogs, and each dog does an incomplete preference list of men. We understand a family as a triple…
We consider a variant of socially stable marriage problem where preference lists may be incomplete, may contain ties and may have bounded length. In real world application like NRMP and Scottish medical matching scheme such restrictions…
We study the notion of robustness in stable matching problems. We first define robustness by introducing (a,b)-supermatches. An $(a,b)$-supermatch is a stable matching in which if $a$ pairs break up it is possible to find another stable…
Focusing on the bipartite Stable Marriage problem, we investigate different robustness measures related to stable matchings. We analyze the computational complexity of computing them and analyze their behavior in extensive experiments on…
A population protocol *stably elects a leader* if, for all $n$, starting from an initial configuration with $n$ agents each in an identical state, with probability 1 it reaches a configuration $\mathbf{y}$ that is correct (exactly one agent…
The stable matching problem has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since the seminal 1962 paper by Gale and Shapley. The number of stable matchings for different systems of preferences has been studied in many…
In this work, we show that for all statistical estimation problems, a natural MMSE instability (discontinuity) condition implies the failure of stable algorithms, serving as a version of OGP for estimation tasks. Using this criterion, we…
We consider the stable matching problem when the preference lists are not given explicitly but are represented in a succinct way and ask whether the problem becomes computationally easier and investigate other implications. We give…
The stable marriage problem with ties is a well-studied and interesting problem in game theory. We are given a set of men and a set of women. Each individual has a preference ordering on the opposite group, which can possibly contain ties.…
Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…
This paper gives an overview on and summarizes existing complexity and algorithmic results of some variants of the Stable Marriage and the Stable Roommates problems. The last section defines a list of stable matching problems mentioned in…
A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an…
We lower bound the complexity of finding $\epsilon$-stationary points (with gradient norm at most $\epsilon$) using stochastic first-order methods. In a well-studied model where algorithms access smooth, potentially non-convex functions…
Approval-based committee selection is a model of significant interest in social choice theory. In this model, we have a set of voters $\mathcal{V}$, a set of candidates $\mathcal{C}$, and each voter has a set $A_v \subset \mathcal{C}$ of…
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…
Population protocols are a model of distributed computing, in which $n$ agents with limited local state interact randomly, and cooperate to collectively compute global predicates. An extensive series of papers, across different communities,…
In this work, we analyze the influence of a single strategic agent on the quality of the other agents' matchings in a matching market. We consider a stable matching problem with $n$ men and $n$ women when preferences are drawn uniformly…
The stable allocation problem is a many-to-many generalization of the well-known stable marriage problem, where we seek a bipartite assignment between, say, jobs (of varying sizes) and machines (of varying capacities) that is "stable" based…