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Cooperation through repetition is an important theme in game theory. In this regard, various celebrated ``folk theorems'' have been proposed for repeated games in increasingly more complex environments. There has, however, been insufficient…
Strategic reasoning enables agents to cooperate, communicate, and compete with other agents in diverse situations. Existing approaches to solving strategic games rely on extensive training, yielding strategies that do not generalize to new…
Performing some task among a set of agents requires the use of some protocol that regulates the interactions between them. If those agents are rational, they may try to subvert the protocol for their own benefit, in an attempt to reach an…
We introduce open games as a compositional foundation of economic game theory. A compositional approach potentially allows methods of game theory and theoretical computer science to be applied to large-scale economic models for which…
ATL is a temporal logic geared towards the specification and verification of properties in multi-agents systems. It allows to reason on the existence of strategies for coalitions of agents in order to enforce a given property. In this…
The design and application of multi-agent systems (MAS) require reasoning about the effects of modifications on their underlying structure. In particular, such changes may impact the satisfaction of system specifications and the strategic…
Verification of large and complicated concurrent programs is an important issue in the software world. Stateless model checking is an appropriate method for systematically and automatically testing of large programs, which has proved its…
In rational verification, the aim is to verify which temporal logic properties will obtain in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents ("players") in the system choose strategies for acting that form a game theoretic…
Fictitious play (FP) is a well-studied algorithm that enables agents to learn Nash equilibrium in games with certain reward structures. However, when agents have no prior knowledge of the reward functions, FP faces a major challenge: the…
We study how to synthesize a robust and safe policy for autonomous systems under signal temporal logic (STL) tasks in adversarial settings against unknown dynamic agents. To ensure the worst-case STL satisfaction, we propose STLGame, a…
In this work, we consider the design of Non-Obviously Manipulable (NOM) mechanisms, mechanisms that bounded rational agents may fail to recognize as manipulable, for two relevant classes of succinctly representable Hedonic Games: Additively…
We examine the tuning of cooperative behavior in repeated multi-agent games using an analytically tractable, continuous-time, nonlinear model of opinion dynamics. Each modeled agent updates its real-valued opinion about each available…
Verification of real-time systems with multiple components controlled by multiple parties is a challenging task due to its computational complexity. We present an on-the-fly algorithm for verifying timed alternating-time temporal logic…
This paper investigates the rationality of large language models (LLMs) in strategic decision-making contexts, specifically within the framework of game theory. We evaluate several state-of-the-art LLMs across a spectrum of…
Finding, counting, or determining the existence of Nash equilibria, where players must play optimally given each others' actions, are known to be computational intractable problems. We ask whether weakening optimality to the requirement…
A central problem in the theory of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is to understand what structural conditions and algorithmic principles lead to sample-efficient learning guarantees, and how these considerations change as we move…
When studying safety properties of (formal) protocol models, it is customary to view the scheduler as an adversary: an entity trying to falsify the safety property. We show that in the context of security protocols, and in particular of…
In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…
In this paper we study the complexity of strategic argumentation for dialogue games. A dialogue game is a 2-player game where the parties play arguments. We show how to model dialogue games in a skeptical, non-monotonic formalism, and we…
The collective of autonomous cars is expected to generate almost optimal traffic. In this position paper we discuss the multi-agent models and the verification results of the collective behaviour of autonomous cars. We argue that…