Related papers: Judgment Aggregation in Multi-Agent Argumentation
Judgment aggregation is a framework to aggregate individual opinions on multiple, logically connected issues into a collective outcome. These opinions are cast by judges, which can be for example referees, experts, advisors or jurors,…
Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mathematical model: Elections as problem of choice or ranking. We show how the model can be enhanced to take into account the complete process…
Complex reasoning problems are most clearly and easily specified using logical rules, but require recursive rules with aggregation such as count and sum for practical applications. Unfortunately, the meaning of such rules has been a…
We consider the challenge of AI value alignment with multiple individuals that have different reward functions and optimal policies in an underlying Markov decision process. We formalize this problem as one of policy aggregation, where the…
In this paper we propose a general approach to define a many-valued preferential interpretation of gradual argumentation semantics. The approach allows for conditional reasoning over arguments and boolean combination of arguments, with…
This study considers the method to derive a ranking of alternatives by aggregating the rankings submitted by several individuals who may not evaluate all of them. The collection of subsets of alternatives that individuals (can) evaluate is…
We consider the problem where a set of individuals has to classify $m$ objects into $p$ categories by aggregating the individual classifications, and no category can be left empty. An aggregator satisfies \emph{Expertise} if individuals are…
Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or disapprove candidates. In this setting, several voting rules…
In this paper we consider the problem of combining multiple probabilistic causal models, provided by different experts, under the requirement that the aggregated model satisfy the criterion of counterfactual fairness. We build upon the work…
We contemplate a higher-level bipolar abstract argumentation for non-elementary arguments such as: X argues against Ys sincerity with the fact that Y has presented his argument to draw a conclusion C, by omitting other facts which would not…
We present an extension-based approach for computing and verifying preferences in an abstract argumentation system. Although numerous argumentation semantics have been developed previously for identifying acceptable sets of arguments from…
An important problem in decision theory concerns the aggregation of individual rankings/ratings into a collective evaluation. We illustrate a new aggregation method in the context of the 2007 MSOM's student paper competition. The…
Formal argumentation is being used increasingly in artificial intelligence as an effective and understandable way to model potentially conflicting pieces of information, called arguments, and identify so-called acceptable arguments…
Model Multiplicity (MM) arises when multiple, equally performing machine learning models can be trained to solve the same prediction task. Recent studies show that models obtained under MM may produce inconsistent predictions for the same…
The literature on judgment aggregation is moving from studying impossibility results regarding aggregation rules towards studying specific judgment aggregation rules. Here we give a structured list of most rules that have been proposed and…
In a context where a decision has to be taken collectively by several agents, the social choice problem consists in deciding whether there exists a socially acceptable rule that aggregates the individual preferences of the agents into a…
Combinatorial preference aggregation has many applications in AI. Given the exponential nature of these preferences, compact representations are needed and ($m$)CP-nets are among the most studied ones. Sequential and global voting are two…
Arrow's `impossibility' theorem asserts that there are no satisfactory methods of aggregating individual preferences into collective preferences in many complex situations. This result has ramifications in economics, politics, i.e., the…
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem establishes bounds on what we can require from voting systems. Given satisfaction of a small collection of "fairness" axioms, it shows votes can only exist as dictatorships in which one voter determines all…
The combination of argumentation and probability paves the way to new accounts of qualitative and quantitative uncertainty, thereby offering new theoretical and applicative opportunities. Due to a variety of interests, probabilistic…