Related papers: An Ordinal Bargaining Solution with Fixed-Point Pr…
Negotiation is a very common interaction between automated agents. Many common negotiation protocols work with cardinal utilities, even though ordinal preferences, which only rank the outcomes, are easier to elicit from humans. In this work…
Two-person bargaining problem is considered as to allocate a number of goods between two players. This paper suggests that any non-trivial division of goods cause a non-zero change on the solution of bargaining. So, a axiom of sharing…
We consider two-person bargaining problems in which (only) the disagreement outcome is private (and possibly correlated) information and it is common knowledge that disagreement is inefficient. We show that if the Pareto frontier is linear,…
Given two finite ordered sets $A = \{a_1, \ldots, a_m\}$ and $B = \{b_1, \ldots, b_n\}$, introduce the set of $m n$ outcomes of the game $O = \{(a, b) \mid a \in A, b \in B\} = \{(a_i, b_j) \mid i \in I = \{1, \ldots, m\}, j \in J = \{1,…
We show, that a simple generalization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with firms proposing due to Gale and Shapley(1962), yeild outcomes for a two-sided contract choice problem, which necessarily belong to the core and are Weakly…
Cooperative bargaining games are widely used to model resource allocation and conflict resolution. Traditional solutions assume the mediator can access agents utility function values and gradients. However, there is an increasing number of…
We solve the two-player bargaining problem employing Weber's law in psychophysics, which is applied to the perception of utility changes. Using this law, the players define the jointly acceptable range of utilities on the Pareto line, which…
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, contingent on the…
We formalize an allocation model under ordinal preferences that is more general than the well-studied Shapley-Scarf housing market. In our model, the agents do not just care which house or resource they get but also care about who gets…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
Usually, to apply game-theoretic methods, we must specify utilities precisely, and we run the risk that the solutions we compute are not robust to errors in this specification. Ordinal games provide an attractive alternative: they require…
We consider a new setting of facility location games with ordinal preferences. In such a setting, we have a set of agents and a set of facilities. Each agent is located on a line and has an ordinal preference over the facilities. Our goal…
We investigate the implementation of reduced-form allocation probabilities in a two-person bargaining problem without side payments, where the agents have to select one alternative from a finite set of social alternatives. We provide a…
We propose a general solution approach for min-max-robust counterparts of combinatorial optimization problems with uncertain linear objectives. We focus on the discrete scenario case, but our approach can be extended to other types of…
We study bilateral trade with interdependent values as an informed-principal problem. The mechanism-selection game has multiple equilibria that differ with respect to principal's payoff and trading surplus. We characterize the equilibrium…
The stable marriage problem, as addressed by Gale and Shapely [1] consists of providing a bipartite matching between n " boys " and n " girls "-each of whom have a totally ordered preference list over the other set-such that there exists no…
This paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested autonomous agents. Now, there are a number of different procedures that can be used for this process; the three main ones being the package deal procedure in which…
In this paper, we introduce a Bayesian revenue-maximizing mechanism design model where the items have fixed, exogenously-given prices. Buyers are unit-demand and have an ordinal ranking over purchasing either one of these items at its given…