Related papers: Kernelization Complexity of Possible Winner and Co…
We study the problem of designing multiwinner voting rules that are candidate monotone and proportional. We show that the set of committees satisfying the proportionality axiom of proportionality for solid coalitions is candidate monotone.…
We study the computational complexity of candidate control in elections with few voters, that is, we consider the parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections with respect to the number of voters as a parameter. We consider…
In the Selective Coloring problem, we are given an integer $k$, a graph $G$, and a partition of $V(G)$ into $p$ parts, and the goal is to decide whether or not we can pick exactly one vertex of each part and obtain a $k$-colorable induced…
In this paper, we study the problem of Participatory Budgeting (PB) with approval ballots, inspired by Multi-Winner Voting schemes. We present generalized preference aggregation methods for participatory budgeting, especially for finding…
Gerrymandering is a practice of manipulating district boundaries and locations in order to achieve a political advantage for a particular party. Lewenberg, Lev, and Rosenschein [AAMAS 2017] initiated the algorithmic study of a…
In a parameterized problem, every instance I comes with a positive integer k. The problem is said to admit a polynomial kernel if, in polynomial time, one can reduce the size of the instance I to a polynomial in k, while preserving the…
We view voting rules as classifiers that assign a winner (a class) to a profile of voters' preferences (an instance). We propose to apply techniques from formal explainability, most notably abductive and contrastive explanations, to…
The computational complexity of winner determination is a classical and important problem in computational social choice. Previous work based on worst-case analysis has established NP-hardness of winner determination for some classic voting…
Integrity of elections is vital to democratic systems, but it is frequently threatened by malicious actors. The study of algorithmic complexity of the problem of manipulating election outcomes by changing its structural features is known as…
Sequential voting rules have played a crucial role in shaping decisions within parliamentary and legislative frameworks. After observing that the existing sequential rules fail several fundamental axioms, Horan and Sprumont [2022] proposed…
We revisit the coalition structure generation problem in which the goal is to partition the players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions so as to maximize the social welfare. One of our key results is a general polynomial-time algorithm…
In this paper we show that sufficient multi-partite quantum entanglement helps in fair and unbiased election of a leader in a distributed network of processors with only linear classical communication complexity. We show that a total of…
Over the past few years, the (parameterized) complexity landscape of constructive control for many prevalent approval-based multiwinner voting (ABMV) rules has been explored. We expand these results in two directions. First, we study…
The paper considers the problem of finding the number of dominant voters in two-level voting procedures. At the first stage, voting is conducted among local groups of voters, and at the second stage, the results are aggregated to form a…
We study the Possible President problem and the Necessary President problem for Schulze voting, a rule that, due to its many desirable axiomatic properties, is popular in practice. In both problems, we are given an election with the…
Approval-like voting rules, such as Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval voting (SP-AV), the Bucklin rule (an adaptive variant of $k$-Approval voting), and the Fallback rule (an adaptive variant of SP-AV) have many desirable…
Motivated by civic problems such as participatory budgeting and multiwinner elections, we consider the problem of public good allocation: Given a set of indivisible projects (or candidates) of different sizes, and voters with different…
Electoral control models ways of changing the outcome of an election via such actions as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. To protect elections from such control attempts, computational complexity has been…
The assumption that voters' preferences share some common structure is a standard way to circumvent NP-hardness results in social choice problems. While the Kemeny ranking problem is NP-hard in the general case, it is known to become easy…
We study the election control problem with multi-votes, where each voter can present a single vote according different views (or layers, we use "layer" to represent "view"). For example, according to the attributes of candidates, such as:…