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Stochastic timed games (STGs), introduced by Bouyer and Forejt, naturally generalize both continuous-time Markov chains and timed automata by providing a partition of the locations between those controlled by two players (Player Box and…

This paper introduces a new class of Dynkin games, where the two players are allowed to make their stopping decisions at a sequence of exogenous Poisson arrival times. The value function and the associated optimal stopping strategy are…

This work establishes sufficient conditions for existence of saddle points in discrete Markov games. The result reveals the relation between dynamic games and static games using dynamic programming equations. This result enables us to prove…

This paper deals with a standard stochastic game model with a continuum of states under the duel-type setup. It newly proposes a hybrid model of game theory and the fluctuation process, which could be applied for various practical decision…

We study a general formulation of the classical two-player Dynkin game in a discrete time Markovian setting. We identify an appropriate class of mixed strategies -- \textit{Markovian randomized stopping times} -- in which players stop at…

We study a class of optimal stopping games (Dynkin games) of preemption type, with uncertainty about the existence of competitors. The set-up is well-suited to model, for example, real options in the context of investors who do not want to…

Mean-payoff games are important quantitative models for open reactive systems. They have been widely studied as games of full observation. In this paper we investigate the algorithmic properties of several sub-classes of mean-payoff games…

We study the value and the optimal strategies for a two-player zero-sum optimal stopping game with incomplete and asymmetric information. In our Bayesian set-up, the drift of the underlying diffusion process is unknown to one player…

The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…

The sero-sum stopping game for the stochastic sequences has been formulated in late sixties of the twenty century by Dynkin (1969). The formulation had the assumption about separability of decision moment of the players which simplified the…

Markov games model interactions among multiple players in a stochastic, dynamic environment. Each player in a Markov game maximizes its expected total discounted reward, which depends upon the policies of the other players. We formulate a…

This paper analyses a stochastic differential game of control and stopping in which one of the players modifies a diffusion process using impulse controls, an adversary then chooses a stopping time to end the game. The paper firstly…

Reinforcement-based learning dynamics may exhibit several limitations when applied in a distributed setup. In (repeatedly-played) multi-player/action strategic-form games, and when each player applies an independent copy of the learning…

In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…

This paper considers the theoretical, computational, and econometric properties of continuous time dynamic discrete choice games with stochastically sequential moves, introduced by Arcidiacono, Bayer, Blevins, and Ellickson (2016). We…

This paper addresses the problem of steering a discrete-time linear dynamical system from an initial Gaussian distribution to a final distribution in a game-theoretic setting. One of the two players strives to minimize a quadratic payoff,…

Mean-payoff games on timed automata are played on the infinite weighted graph of configurations of priced timed automata between two players, Player Min and Player Max, by moving a token along the states of the graph to form an infinite…

We present and study a variant of the mean payoff games introduced by A. Ehrenfeucht and J. Mycielski. In this version, the second player makes an infinite sequence of moves only after the first player's sequence of moves has been decided…

In 1953, Lloyd Shapley defined the model of stochastic games, which were the first general dynamic model of a game to be defined, and proved that competitive stochastic games have a discounted value. In 1982, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois Mertens and…

We propose a new evolutionary dynamics for population games with a discrete strategy set, inspired by the theory of optimal transport and Mean field games. The dynamics can be described as a Fokker-Planck equation on a discrete strategy…