Related papers: Reallocation Mechanisms
When machine learning is outsourced to a rational agent, conflicts of interest might arise and severely impact predictive performance. In this work, we propose a theoretical framework for incentive-aware delegation of machine learning…
The emergent behavior of a distributed system is conditioned by the information available to the local decision-makers. Therefore, one may expect that providing decision-makers with more information will improve system performance; in this…
The paper addresses large-scale, convex optimization problems that need to be solved in a distributed way by agents communicating according to a random time-varying graph. Specifically, the goal of the network is to minimize the sum of…
This paper proposes a potential game theoretic approach to address event-triggered distributed resource allocation in multi-agent systems. The fitness dynamic of the population is proposed and exploited as a linear parametervarying dynamic…
The problem of allocating indivisible resources to agents arises in a wide range of domains, including treatment distribution and social support programs. An important goal in algorithm design for this problem is fairness, where the focus…
Mechanism design in resource allocation studies dividing limited resources among self-interested agents whose satisfaction with the allocation depends on privately held utilities. We consider the problem in a payment-free setting, with the…
In financial markets, agents often mutually influence each other's investment strategies and adjust their strategies to align with others. However, there is limited quantitative study of agents' investment strategies in such scenarios. In…
The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategic setting, where the states of the tasks and resources are…
We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a…
There is an extensive literature that studies how to find optimal policies in resource allocation problems, taking the underlying design parameters that define the allocation, such as what data is collected, how many people can be served,…
Networked public goods games model scenarios in which self-interested agents decide whether or how much to invest in an action that benefits not only themselves, but also their network neighbors. Examples include vaccination, security…
We consider the problem of social choice when transfers between agents are possible. This includes several canonical applications: public-good provision, management of a common resource, settlement of debts, and division of goods. The…
We consider cooperative multi-agent consensus optimization problems over an undirected network of agents, where only those agents connected by an edge can directly communicate. The objective is to minimize the sum of agent-specific…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
We investigate the implementation of reduced-form allocation probabilities in a two-person bargaining problem without side payments, where the agents have to select one alternative from a finite set of social alternatives. We provide a…
The inefficiency of selfish routing in congested networks is a classical problem in algorithmic game theory, often captured by the Price of Anarchy (i.e., the ratio between the social cost of decentralized decisions and that of a centrally…
We propose a set of conservative models in which agents exchange wealth with a preference in the choice of interacting agents in different ways. The common feature in all the models is that the temporary values of financial status of agents…
We study the allocation of shared resources over multiple rounds among competing agents, via the dynamic max-min fair (DMMF) mechanism: the good in each round is allocated to the requesting agent with the least number of allocations…
There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n competing agents (n > p) each with unit demand. It is required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment problem satisfying weak budget balance, individual rationality, and…
In this paper, we study the problem of expected utility maximization of an agent who, in addition to an initial capital, receives random endowments at maturity. Contrary to previous studies, we treat as the variables of the optimization…