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The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…
Learning processes in games explain how players grapple with one another in seeking an equilibrium. We study a natural model of learning based on individual gradients in two-player continuous games. In such games, the arguably natural…
Network games provide a framework to study strategic decision making processes that are governed by structured interdependencies among agents. However, existing models do not account for environments in which agents simultaneously interact…
The theory of learning in games has extensively studied situations where agents respond dynamically to each other by optimizing a fixed utility function. However, in real situations, the strategic environment varies as a result of past…
Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
Imitation dynamics for population games are studied and their asymptotic properties analyzed. In the considered class of imitation dynamics - that encompass the replicator equation as well as other models previously considered in…
We analyze the performance of the best-response dynamic across all normal-form games using a random games approach. The playing sequence -- the order in which players update their actions -- is essentially irrelevant in determining whether…
The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many…
Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these…
In this paper we consider the problem of distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking over networks, a setting in which players have limited local information. We start from a continuous-time gradient-play dynamics that converges to an NE…
In this paper, we study a model of network formation in large populations. Each agent can choose the strength of interaction (i.e. connection) with other agents to find a Nash equilibrium. Different from the recently-developed theory of…
The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…
Computational aspects of solution notions such as Nash equilibrium have been extensively studied, including settings where the ultimate goal is to find an equilibrium that possesses some additional properties. Furthermore, in order to…
Productive societies feature high levels of cooperation and strong connections between individuals. Public Goods Games (PGGs) are frequently used to study the development of social connections and cooperative behavior in model societies. In…
We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her…
We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of…
In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…
Predicting selfish behavior in public environments by considering Nash equilibria is a central concept of game theory. For the dynamic traffic assignment problem modeled by a flow over time game, in which every particle tries to reach its…
Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as Matching Pennies, where their…