Related papers: Optimal Spectrum Auction Design with Two-Dimension…
Spectrum management has been identified as a crucial step towards enabling the technology of the cognitive radio network (CRN). Most of the current works dealing with spectrum management in the CRN focus on a single task of the problem,…
This paper studies some basic problems in a multiple-object auction model using methodologies from theoretical computer science. We are especially concerned with situations where an adversary bidder knows the bidding algorithms of all the…
We derive optimal strategies for a bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We prove that, if everyone else bids locally in a single auction, the global bidder should always…
With the advancement of machine learning, an increasing number of studies are employing automated mechanism design (AMD) methods for optimal auction design. However, all previous AMD architectures designed to generate optimal mechanisms…
Bid shading has become a standard practice in the digital advertising industry, in which most auctions for advertising (ad) opportunities are now of first price type. Given an ad opportunity, performing bid shading requires estimating not…
The design of revenue-maximizing auctions with strong incentive guarantees is a core concern of economic theory. Computational auctions enable online advertising, sourcing, spectrum allocation, and myriad financial markets. Analytic…
Optimal auction design is a fundamental problem in algorithmic game theory. This problem is notoriously difficult already in very simple settings. Recent work in differentiable economics showed that neural networks can efficiently learn…
Unlicensed secondary users (SUs) in cognitive radio networks are subject to an inherent tradeoff between spectrum sensing and spectrum access. Although each SU has an incentive to sense the primary user (PU) channels for locating spectrum…
Simple Clock Auctions (SCA) are a mechanism commonly used in spectrum auctions to sell lots of frequency bandwidths. We study such an auction with one player having access to perfect information against straightforward bidders. When the…
A diffusion auction refers to a selling process conducted over a social network, where each participant submits a bid and may invite other potential buyers to join the auction. Although various mechanisms have been proposed, none of them…
A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty…
Collaborative spectrum sensing among secondary users (SUs) in cognitive networks is shown to yield a significant performance improvement. However, there exists an inherent trade off between the gains in terms of probability of detection of…
Calibration is a basic property for prediction systems, and algorithms for achieving it are well-studied in both statistics and machine learning. In many applications, however, the predictions are used to make decisions that select which…
In this paper, we consider a time-slotted cognitive radio (CR) setting with buffered and energy harvesting primary and CR users. At the beginning of each time slot, the CR user probabilistically chooses the spectrum sensing duration from a…
We cast the problem of combinatorial auction design in a Bayesian framework in order to incorporate prior information into the auction process and minimize the number of rounds to convergence. We first develop a generative model of agent…
For decades, Simultaneous Ascending Auction (SAA) has been the most popular mechanism used for spectrum auctions. It has recently been employed by many countries for the allocation of 5G licences. Although SAA presents relatively simple…
Radio Spectrum is most precious and scarce resource and must be utilized efficiently and effectively. Cognitive radio is the promising solutions for the optimum utilization of the scared natural resource. The spectrum owned by the primary…
In recent years there is a growing effort to provide learning algorithms for spectrum collaboration. In this paper we present a medium access control protocol which allows spectrum collaboration with minimal regret and high spectral…
We study the problem of characterizing revenue optimal auctions for single-minded buyers. Each buyer is interested only in a specific bundle of items and has a value for the same. Both his bundle and its value are his private information.…
We study optimal auction design in an independent private values environment where bidders can endogenously -- but at a cost -- improve information about their own valuations. The optimal mechanism is two-stage: at stage-1 bidders register…