Related papers: Robust Newsvendor Games with Ambiguity in Demand D…

We present a new model of incomplete information games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with the payoff uncertainty. With some specific restrictions, we show that…

The global markets provide enterprises with selling opportunities and challenges in stabilizing operational strategies. From the perspective of production management, it is important to improve the profitability of an enterprise by…

In this paper we introduce the novel framework of distributionally robust games. These are multi-player games where each player models the state of nature using a worst-case distribution, also called adversarial distribution. Thus each…

Renewable energy generation is offered through electricity markets, quite some time in advance. This then leads to a problem of decision-making under uncertainty, which may be seen as a newsvendor problem. Contrarily to the conventional…

The rapid expansion of digital commerce platforms has amplified the strategic importance of coordinated pricing and inventory management decisions among competing retailers. Motivated by practices on leading e-commerce platforms, we analyze…

We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

This paper studies the stochastic setting in cooperative games and suggests a solution concept based on second order stochastic dominance (SSD), which is often applied to robustly model risk averse behaviour of players in different economic…

In this paper, we consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) coalitional games where the coalitional values are unknown but vary within certain bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalise the notion of "robust…

This paper expands the work on distributionally robust newsvendor to incorporate moment constraints. The use of Wasserstein distance as the ambiguity measure is preserved. The infinite dimensional primal problem is formulated; problem of…

A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…

Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty regarding…

We consider a fundamental generalization of the classical newsvendor problem where the seller needs to decide on the inventory of a product jointly for multiple locations on a metric as well as a fulfillment policy to satisfy the uncertain…

In this paper we consider multi-agent coalitional games with uncertain value functions for which we establish distribution-free guarantees on the probability of allocation stability, i.e., agents do not have incentives to defect from the…

Uncertainty is ubiquitous in games, both in the agents playing games and often in the games themselves. Working with uncertainty is therefore an important component of successful deep reinforcement learning agents. While there has been…

Problem definition: We consider a newsvendor problem with unknown demand distribution, where we distinguish ambiguity under which the newsvendor does not differentiate demand distributions of common characteristics and misspecification…

We evaluate the robustness of agents' traffic equilibria in randomized routing games characterized by an uncertain network demand with a possibly unknown probability distribution. Specifically, we extend the so-called hose model by…

The classical, complete-information two-player games assume that the problem data (in particular the payoff matrix) is known exactly by both players. In a now famous result, Nash has shown that any such game has an equilibrium in mixed…

This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…

Dybvig (1988a,b) solves in a complete market setting the problem of finding a payoff that is cheapest possible in reaching a given target distribution ("cost-efficient payoff"). In the presence of ambiguity, the distribution of a payoff is,…