Related papers: Self-stabilizing uncoupled dynamics
In this note, we consider repeated play of a finite game using learning rules whose period-by-period behavior probabilities or empirical distributions converge to some notion of equilibria of the stage game. Our primary focus is on…
Self-stabilization is a versatile fault-tolerance approach that characterizes the ability of a system to eventually resume a correct behavior after any finite number of transient faults. In this paper, we propose a self-stabilizing reset…
Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…
We consider a broad class of stochastic imitation dynamics over networks, encompassing several well known learning models such as the replicator dynamics. In the considered models, players have no global information about the game…
The theory of learning in games has extensively studied situations where agents respond dynamically to each other by optimizing a fixed utility function. However, in real situations, the strategic environment varies as a result of past…
We study an independent best-response dynamics on network games in which the nodes (players) decide to revise their strategies independently with some probability. We provide several bounds on the convergence time to an equilibrium as a…
We demonstrate the advantages of randomization in coherent quantum dynamical control. For systems which are either time-varying or require decoupling cycles involving a large number of operations, we find that simple randomized protocols…
In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…
We construct two models of discrete-time replicator dynamics with time delay. In the social-type model, players imitate opponents taking into account average payoffs of games played some units of time ago. In the biological-type model, new…
We derive a class of macroscopic differential equations that describe collective adaptation, starting from a discrete-time stochastic microscopic model. The behavior of each agent is a dynamic balance between adaptation that locally…
The best-response dynamics is an example of an evolutionary game where players update their strategy in order to maximize their payoff. The main objective of this paper is to study a stochastic spatial version of this game based on the…
A distributed algorithm is self-stabilizing if after faults and attacks hit the system and place it in some arbitrary global state, the systems recovers from this catastrophic situation without external intervention in finite time.…
We propose a new mean-field game model with two states to study synchronization phenomena, and we provide a comprehensive characterization of stationary and dynamic equilibria along with their stability properties. The game undergoes a…
Markov games with coupling constraints model constrained dynamical decision-making involving self-interested agents, where the feasibility of an individual agent's strategy depends on the joint strategies of the others. Such games arise in…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
One of the main criticisms to game theory concerns the assumption of full rationality. Logit dynamics is a decentralized algorithm in which a level of irrationality (a.k.a. "noise") is introduced in players' behavior. In this context, the…
In multi-agent problems requiring a high degree of cooperation, success often depends on the ability of the agents to adapt to each other's behavior. A natural solution concept in such settings is the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the…
We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…
Coordination games with explicit spatial or relational structure are of interest to economists, ecologists, sociologists, and others studying emergent global properties in collective behavior. When assemblies of individuals seek to…
A dynamical decoupling method is presented which is based on embedding a deterministic decoupling scheme into a stochastic one. This way it is possible to combine the advantages of both methods and to increase the suppression of undesired…