Related papers: Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial AC Electric …
Traditional studies of combinatorial auctions often only consider linear constraints. The rise of smart grid presents a new class of auctions, characterized by quadratic constraints. This paper studies the {\em complex-demand knapsack…
We consider AC electrical systems where each electrical device has a power demand expressed as a complex number, and there is a limit on the magnitude of total power supply. Motivated by this scenario, we introduce the complex-demand…
We study procurement games where each seller supplies multiple units of his item, with a cost per unit known only to him. The buyer can purchase any number of units from each seller, values different combinations of the items differently,…
We consider the problem of scheduling complex-valued demands over a discretized time horizon. Given a set of users, each user is associated with a set of demands representing different power consumption preferences. A demand is represented…
We address the classical knapsack problem and a variant in which an upper bound is imposed on the number of items that can be selected. We show that appropriate combinations of rounding techniques yield novel and powerful ways of rounding.…
Combinatorial contracts are emerging as a key paradigm in algorithmic contract design, paralleling the role of combinatorial auctions in algorithmic mechanism design. In this paper we study natural combinatorial contract settings involving…
In many settings the power of truthful mechanisms is severely bounded. In this paper we use randomization to overcome this problem. In particular, we construct an FPTAS for multi-unit auctions that is truthful in expectation, whereas there…
We consider the product knapsack problem, which is the variant of the classical 0-1 knapsack problem where the objective consists of maximizing the product of the profits of the selected items. These profits are allowed to be positive or…
Given a combinatorial decomposition for a counting problem, we resort to the simple scheme of approximating large numbers by floating-point representations in order to obtain efficient Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Schemes (FPTASes)…
This paper examines knapsack auctions as a method to solve the knapsack problem with incomplete information, where object values are private and sizes are public. We analyze three auction types-uniform price (UP), discriminatory price (DP),…
In this paper, we study the problem of counting the number of different knapsack solutions with a prescribed cardinality. We present an FPTAS for this problem, based on dynamic programming. We also introduce two different types of semi-fair…
This paper derives polynomial-time approximation schemes for several NP-hard stochastic optimization problems from the algorithmic mechanism design and operations research literatures. The problems we consider involve a principal or seller…
Consider costly and time-consuming tasks that add up to the success of a project, and must be fitted into a given time-frame. This is an instance of the classic budgeted maximization (knapsack) problem, which admits an FPTAS. Now assume an…
We consider a variant of the knapsack problem, where items are available with different possible weights. Using a separate budget for these item improvements, the question is: Which items should be improved to which degree such that the…
The AC Optimal power flow (OPF) problem is one of the most fundamental problems in power systems engineering. For the past decades, researchers have been relying on unproven heuristics to tackle OPF. The hardness of OPF stems from two…
The Time-Invariant Incremental Knapsack problem (IIK) is a generalization of Maximum Knapsack to a discrete multi-period setting. At each time, capacity increases and items can be added, but not removed from the knapsack. The goal is to…
Combinatorial auctions (CA) are a well-studied area in algorithmic mechanism design. However, contrary to the standard model, empirical studies suggest that a bidder's valuation often does not depend solely on the goods assigned to him. For…
We formalize a framework for coordinating funding and selecting projects, the costs of which are shared among agents with quasi-linear utility functions and individual budgets. Our model contains the classical discrete participatory…
We introduce and study a general version of the fractional online knapsack problem with multiple knapsacks, heterogeneous constraints on which items can be assigned to which knapsack, and rate-limiting constraints on the assignment of items…
Periodic Double Auctions (PDAs) are commonly used in the real world for trading, e.g. in stock markets to determine stock opening prices, and energy markets to trade energy in order to balance net demand in smart grids, involving trillions…