Related papers: Social welfare in one-sided matchings: Random prio…

Consider the problem of finding a population or a probability distribution amongst many with the largest mean when these means are unknown but population samples can be simulated or otherwise generated. Typically, by selecting largest…

Statistical parity metrics have been widely studied and endorsed in the AI community as a means of achieving fairness, but they suffer from at least two weaknesses. They disregard the actual welfare consequences of decisions and may…

We consider design of monetary mechanisms for two-sided matching. Mechanisms in the tradition of the deferred acceptance algorithm, even in variants incorporating money, tend to focus on the criterion of stability. Instead, in this work we…

We study the problem in which a central planner sequentially allocates a single resource to multiple strategic agents using their utility reports at each round, but without using any monetary transfers. We consider general agent utility…

One-sided matching mechanisms are fundamental for assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of self-interested agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Two widely-studied randomized mechanisms in multiagent settings are the…

We study the fair division problem on divisible heterogeneous resources (the cake cutting problem) with strategic agents, where each agent can manipulate his/her private valuation in order to receive a better allocation. A…

We show that, in a resource allocation problem, the ex ante aggregate utility of players with cumulative-prospect-theoretic preferences can be increased over deterministic allocations by implementing lotteries. We formulate an optimization…

In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have…

We study the power of polynomial-time truthful mechanisms comparing to polynomial time (non-truthful) algorithms. We show that there is a setting in which deterministic polynomial-time truthful mechanisms cannot guarantee a bounded…

Matching platforms, such as online dating services and job recommendations, have become increasingly prevalent. For the success of these platforms, it is crucial to design reciprocal recommender systems (RRSs) that not only increase the…

Fair resource allocation is a fundamental optimization problem with applications in operations research, networking, and economic and game theory. Research in these areas has led to the general acceptance of a class of $\alpha$-fair utility…

The problem of dividing resources fairly occurs in many practical situations and is therefore an important topic of study in economics. In this paper, we investigate envy-free divisions in the setting where there are multiple players in…

We consider the complexity of maximizing egalitarian welfare in Friends and Enemies Games -- a subclass of hedonic games in which every agent partitions other agents into friends and enemies. We investigate two classic scenarios proposed in…

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. When randomization is allowed, it is possible to achieve compelling notions of fairness such as envy-freeness, which states that no agent should…

We study the classic setting of envy-free pricing, in which a single seller chooses prices for its many items, with the goal of maximizing revenue once the items are allocated. Despite the large body of work addressing such settings, most…

Now that machine learning algorithms lie at the center of many resource allocation pipelines, computer scientists have been unwittingly cast as partial social planners. Given this state of affairs, important questions follow. What is the…

The maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) -- which maximizes the geometric mean of agents' utilities -- is a fundamental solution concept with remarkable fairness and efficiency guarantees. The computational aspects of NSW have been extensively…

We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…

Mechanism design in resource allocation studies dividing limited resources among self-interested agents whose satisfaction with the allocation depends on privately held utilities. We consider the problem in a payment-free setting, with the…

Computational and economic results suggest that social welfare maximization and combinatorial auction design are much easier when bidders' valuations satisfy the "gross substitutes" condition. The goal of this paper is to evaluate…