Related papers: Biased imitation in coupled evolutionary games in …
We introduce a mathematical model that combines the concepts of complex contagion with payoff-biased imitation, to describe how social behaviors spread through a population. Traditional models of social learning by imitation are based on…
We use replicator dynamics to study an iterated prisoners' dilemma game with memory. In this study, we investigate the characteristics of all 32 possible strategies with a single-step memory by observing the results when each strategy…
In spatial games players typically alter their strategy by imitating the most successful or one randomly selected neighbor. Since a single neighbor is taken as reference, the information stemming from other neighbors is neglected, which…
The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has guided research on social dilemmas for decades. However, it distinguishes between only two atomic actions: cooperate and defect. In real-world prisoner's dilemmas, these choices are temporally extended…
In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…
We study the evolution of cooperation in populations where individuals play prisoner's dilemma on a network. Every node of the network corresponds on an individual choosing whether to cooperate or defect in a repeated game. The players…
The success of imitation as an evolutionary driving force in spatial games has often been questioned, especially for social dilemmas such as the snowdrift game, where the most profitable may be the mixed phase sustaining both the…
We study the effects of mobility on the evolution of cooperation among mobile players, which imitate collective motion of biological flocks and interact with neighbors within a prescribed radius $R$. Adopting the prisoner's dilemma game and…
The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal (IPD/CR) is an extension of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with evolution that allows players to choose and to refuse their game partners. From individual behaviors, behavioral…
Cooperation and defection are social traits whose evolutionary origin is still unresolved. Recent behavioral experiments with humans suggested that strategy changes are driven mainly by the individuals' expectations and not by imitation.…
Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone's strategy just by observing the…
Cooperative behavior is common in nature even if selfishness is sometimes better for an individual. Empirical and theoretical studies have shown that the invasion and expansion of cooperators are related to an inhomogeneous connectivity…
Holding on to one's strategy is natural and common if the later warrants success and satisfaction. This goes against widespread simulation practices of evolutionary games, where players frequently consider changing their strategy even…
The commonly used accumulated payoff scheme is not invariant with respect to shifts of payoff values when applied locally in degree-inhomogeneous population structures. We propose a suitably modified payoff scheme and we show both formally…
We introduce a community network model which exhibits scale-free property and study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG) on this network model. It is found that the frequency of cooperators decreases with the increment of the…
We have studied a spatially extended snowdrift game, in which the players are located on the sites of two-dimensional square lattices and repeatedly have to choose one of the two strategies, either cooperation (C) or defection (D). A player…
We investigate an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game among self-driven agents, where collective motion of biological flocks is imitated through averaging directions of neighbors. Depending on the temptation to defect and the velocity at…
We present a memory-based snowdrift game (MBSG) taking place on networks. We found that, when a lattice is taken to be the underlying structure, the transition of spatial patterns at some critical values of the payoff parameter is…
Evolutionary game theory has been widely used to study the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas where imitation-led strategy updates are typically assumed. However, results of recent behavioral experiments are not compatible with the…
Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is…