Related papers: Privacy-Preserving Public Information for Sequenti…
A game is introduced to study the effect of privacy in strategic communication between well-informed senders and a receiver. The receiver wants to accurately estimate a random variable. The sender, however, wants to communicate a message…
The problem of analyzing the effect of privacy concerns on the behavior of selfish utility-maximizing agents has received much attention lately. Privacy concerns are often modeled by altering the utility functions of agents to consider also…
Nowadays, mobile users have a vast number of applications and services at their disposal. Each of these might impose some privacy threats on users' "Personally Identifiable Information" (PII). Location privacy is a crucial part of PII, and…
Quantum secret sharing allows each player to have classical information for secret sharing in quantum mechanical ways. In this work, we construct a class of quantum states on which players can quantumly perform secret sharing secure against…
When companies release marketing materials aimed at promoting their privacy practices or highlighting specific privacy features, what do they actually communicate to consumers? In this paper, we explore the impact of privacy marketing on:…
Private signals model noisy information about an unknown state. Although these signals are called "private," they may still carry information about each other. Our paper introduces the concept of private private signals, which contain…
It has been shown elsewhere that quantum resources can allow us to achieve a family of equilibria that can have sometimes a better social welfare, while guaranteeing privacy. We use graph games to propose a way to build non-cooperative…
When users lack specific knowledge of various system parameters, their uncertainty may lead them to make undesirable deviations in their decision making. To alleviate this, an informed system operator may elect to signal information to…
We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full…
A policymaker discloses public information to interacting agents who also acquire costly private information. More precise public information reduces the precision and cost of acquired private information. Considering this effect, what…
Information sharing among organizations has been gaining attention as a method for improving cybersecurity. However, the associated disclosure costs act as deterrents for firms' voluntary cooperation. In this work, we take a game-theoretic…
We propose a public goods game model of user sharing in an online commenting forum. In particular, we assume that users who share personal information incur an information cost but reap the benefits of a more extensive social interaction.…
In settings like vaccination registries, individuals act after observing others, and the resulting public records can expose private information. We study privacy-preserving sequential learning, where agents add endogenous noise to their…
We study zero-sum differential games with state constraints and one-sided information, where the informed player (Player 1) has a categorical payoff type unknown to the uninformed player (Player 2). The goal of Player 1 is to minimize his…
To take advantage of strategy commitment, a useful tactic of playing games, a leader must learn enough information about the follower's payoff function. However, this leaves the follower a chance to provide fake information and influence…
In imperfect information games, the evaluation of a game state not only depends on the observable world but also relies on hidden parts of the environment. As accessing the obstructed information trivialises state evaluations, one approach…
We study the implementability of stable matchings in a two-sided market model with one-sided incomplete information. Firms' types are publicly known, whereas workers' types are private information. A mechanism generates a matching and…
Strategic agents in incomplete-information environments have a conflicted relationship with uncertainty: it can keep them unpredictable to their opponents, but it must also be overcome to predict the actions of those opponents. We use a…
In the fight against tax evaders and other cheats, governments seek to gather more information about their citizens. In this paper we claim that this increased transparency, combined with ineptitude, or corruption, can lead to widespread…
A common goal in the areas of secure information flow and privacy is to build effective defenses against unwanted leakage of information. To this end, one must be able to reason about potential attacks and their interplay with possible…