Related papers: A note on the strong formulation of stochastic con…
This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic (LQ) leader-follower differential game with mixed deterministic and stochastic controls. In the game, the follower is a random controller which means that the follower can choose adapted…
We consider a zero-sum stochastic differential game over elementary mixed feed-back strategies. These are strategies based only on the knowledge of the past state, randomized continuously in time from a sampling distribution which is kept…
We study a two-player, zero-sum, dynamic game with incomplete information where one of the players is more informed than his opponent. We analyze the limit value as the players play more and more frequently. The more informed player…
We examine the problem of the existence of optimal deterministic stationary strategiesintwo-players antagonistic (zero-sum) perfect information stochastic games with finitely many states and actions.We show that the existenceof such…
The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed probabilistic analysis of the optimal control of nonlinear stochastic dynamical systems of the McKean Vlasov type. Motivated by the recent interest in mean field games, we highlight the…
Standard stochastic control methods assume that the probability distribution of uncertain variables is available. Unfortunately, in practice, obtaining accurate distribution information is a challenging task. To resolve this issue, we…
We introduce and study a two-player zero-sum game between a probabilist and Nature defined by a convex function $f$, a finite collection $\mathcal{B}$ of Markov generators (or its convex hull), and a target distribution $\pi$. The…
A new formulation of Stochastic Model Predictive Output Feedback Control is presented and analyzed as a translation of Stochastic Optimal Output Feedback Control into a receding horizon setting. This requires lifting the design into a…
The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…
We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…
We formulate a new class of two-person zero-sum differential games, in a stochastic setting, where a specification on a target terminal state distribution is imposed on the players. We address such added specification by introducing…
This paper thoroughly investigates stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problems with the Markovian regime switching system, where the coefficients of the state equation and the weighting matrices of the cost functional are random.…
This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg stochastic differential game with asymmetric noisy observation, with one follower and one leader. In our model, the follower cannot observe the state process directly, but could observe a noisy…
In this paper, we study a class of zero-sum two-player stochastic differential games with the controlled stochastic differential equations and the payoff/cost functionals of recursive type. As opposed to the pioneering work by Fleming and…
This paper presents a learning dynamic with almost sure convergence guarantee for any stochastic game with turn-based controllers (on state transitions) as long as stage-payoffs induce a zero-sum or identical-interest game. Stage-payoffs…
We study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with both players adopting impulse controls, on a finite time horizon. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) partial differential equation of the game turns out to be a…
We consider the problem of security-aware planning in an unknown stochastic environment, in the presence of attacks on control signals (i.e., actuators) of the robot. We model the attacker as an agent who has the full knowledge of the…
In this letter, we study dynamic game optimal control with imperfect state observations and introduce an iterative method to find a local Nash equilibrium. The algorithm consists of an iterative procedure combining a backward recursion…
In this paper, we study closed-loop strong equilibrium strategies for the time-inconsistent control problem with higher-order moments formulated by [Wang et al. SIAM J. Control. Optim., 63 (2025), 1560--1589]. Since time-inconsistency makes…
We introduce a class of robust control problems formulated in min-max form, in which the principal agent is viewed as a central planner facing Nature. The agent's cost is a nonlinear function of all its possible realizations, encompassing…