Related papers: Partial-conjugates and Dimensionality of Posets
A preference system $\mathcal{I}$ is an undirected graph where vertices have preferences over their neighbors, and $\mathcal{I}$ admits a master list if all preferences can be derived from a single ordering over all vertices. We study the…
In rank aggregation, members of a population rank issues to decide which are collectively preferred. We focus instead on identifying divisive issues that express disagreements among the preferences of individuals. We analyse the properties…
We explore lattice structures on integer binary relations (i.e. binary relations on the set $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ for a fixed integer $n$) and on integer posets (i.e. partial orders on the set $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ for a fixed integer $n$).…
We discuss possible definitions of structural balance conditions in a network with preference orderings as node attributes. The main result is that for the case with three alternatives ($A,B,C$) we reduce the $(3!)^3 = 216$ possible…
We consider databases in which each attribute takes values from a partially ordered set (poset). This allows one to model a number of interesting scenarios arising in different applications, including quantitative databases, taxonomies, and…
Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable when voters' preferences belong to a restricted domain, such as those of single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. However, to date, all algorithmic results of…
Preference Inference involves inferring additional user preferences from elicited or observed preferences, based on assumptions regarding the form of the user's preference relation. In this paper we consider a situation in which…
Standard ordinal allocation methods ignore how strongly agents value different improvements, while cardinal methods require additional assumptions that are often considered too demanding. This paper studies assignment problems in the middle…
In this work we generalize standard Decision Theory by assuming that two outcomes can also be incomparable. Two motivating scenarios show how incomparability may be helpful to represent those situations where, due to lack of information,…
Preferences, fundamental in all forms of strategic behavior and collective decision-making, in their raw form, are an abstract ordering on a set of alternatives. Agents, we assume, revise their preferences as they gain more information…
A set $S\subseteq V$ is a dominating set of $G$ if every vertex in $V - S$ is adjacent to at least one vertex in $S$. The domination number $\gamma(G)$ of $G$ equals the minimum cardinality of a dominating set $S$ in $G$; we say that such a…
Engineering design problems are often modeled as multi-objective optimization tasks in which a scalarized utility function selects an optimal design from the Pareto set. In practice, preferences are imperfectly known, so uncertainty in the…
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism can generate inefficient placements. Although Pareto-dominant mechanisms exist, it remains unclear which and how many students could improve. We characterize the set of unimprovable students and show…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
Roommate problems with convex preferences always have stable matchings. Efficiency and individual rationality are, moreover, compatible with strategyproofness in such convex roommate problems. Both of these results fail without the…
In this paper, we use a new partial order, called the f-majorization order. The new order includes as special cases the majorization , the reciprocal majorization and the p-larger orders. We provide a comprehensive account of the…
We study poset limits given by sequences of finite interval orders or, as a special case, finite semiorders. In the interval order case, we show that every such limit can be represented by a probability measure on the space of closed…
Many real-world decision-making problems involve optimizing multiple objectives simultaneously, rendering the selection of the most preferred solution a non-trivial problem: All Pareto optimal solutions are viable candidates, and it is…
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under additive utilities. When the utilities can be negative, the existence and complexity of an allocation that satisfies Pareto optimality and proportionality up to one item (PROP1) is an…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…