Related papers: Finding Preference Profiles of Condorcet Dimension…
We introduce the dueling teams problem, a new online-learning setting in which the learner observes noisy comparisons of disjoint pairs of $k$-sized teams from a universe of $n$ players. The goal of the learner is to minimize the number of…
This paper introduces an extension of Answer Set Programming called Preference Set Constraint Programming which is a convenient and general formalism to reason with preferences. PSC programming extends Set Constraint Programming introduced…
This paper studies a dominance relation among scoring rules with respect to avoiding the selection of the Condorcet loser. In a voting model with three or more alternatives, we say that a scoring rule $f$ Condorcet-loser-dominates…
The study of large Condorcet domains (CD) has been a significant area of interest in voting theory. In this paper, our goal is to search for large CDs that are hitherto unknown. With a straightforward combinatorial definition, searching for…
Preference cycles are prevalent in problems of decision-making, and are contradictory when preferences are assumed to be transitive. This contradiction underlies Condorcet's Paradox, a pioneering result of Social Choice Theory, wherein…
We investigate how the Hausdorff dimensions of microsets are related to the dimensions of the original set. It is known that the maximal dimension of a microset is the Assouad dimension of the set. We prove that the lower dimension can…
Recent advancements in Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) have significantly enhanced the alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences, owing to its simplicity and effectiveness. However, existing methods typically…
In multiagent systems, we often have a set of agents each of which have a preference ordering over a set of items and one would like to know these preference orderings for various tasks, for example, data analysis, preference aggregation,…
In the well-studied metric distortion problem in social choice, we have voters and candidates located in a shared metric space, and the objective is to design a voting rule that selects a candidate with minimal total distance to the voters.…
VC-dimension and $\varepsilon$-nets are key concepts in Statistical Learning Theory. Intuitively, VC-dimension is a measure of the size of a class of sets. The famous $\varepsilon$-net theorem, a fundamental result in Discrete Geometry,…
In some preference aggregation scenarios, voters' preferences are highly structured: e.g., the set of candidates may have one-dimensional structure (so that voters' preferences are single-peaked) or be described by a binary decision tree…
Mechanism design is concerned with settings where a policymaker (or social planner) faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple agents into a collective (or social), system-wide decision. One of the most important…
We present a relation-algebraic model of Condorcet voting and, based on it, relation-algebraic solutions of the constructive control problem via the removal of voters. We consider two winning conditions, viz. to be a Condorcet winner and to…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
Euclidean preferences are a widely studied preference model, in which decision makers and alternatives are embedded in d-dimensional Euclidean space. Decision makers prefer those alternatives closer to them. This model, also known as…
Given a data-set of consumer behaviour, the Revealed Preference Graph succinctly encodes inferred relative preferences between observed outcomes as a directed graph. Not all graphs can be constructed as revealed preference graphs when the…
We study the problem of learning a high-density region of an arbitrary distribution over $\mathbb{R}^d$. Given a target coverage parameter $\delta$, and sample access to an arbitrary distribution $D$, we want to output a confidence set $S…
In multiwinner approval elections with many candidates, voters may struggle to determine their preferences over the entire slate of candidates. It is therefore of interest to explore which (if any) fairness guarantees can be provided under…
We prove that every Condorcet-consistent voting rule can be manipulated by a voter who completely reverses their preference ranking, assuming that there are at least 4 alternatives. This corrects an error and improves a result of [Sanver,…
In decision-making problems under uncertainty, probabilistic constraints are a valuable tool to express safety of decisions. They result from taking the probability measure of a given set of random inequalities depending on the decision…