Related papers: Constant Rank Bimatrix Games are PPAD-hard
Consider a strongly monotone game where the players' utility functions include a reward function and a linear term for each dimension, with coefficients that are controlled by the manager. Gradient play converges to a unique Nash…
We study algorithmic complexity of solving subtraction games in a~fixed dimension with a finite difference set. We prove that there exists a game in this class such that any algorithm solving the game runs in exponential time. Also we prove…
We develop value iteration-based algorithms to solve in a unified manner different classes of combinatorial zero-sum games with mean-payoff type rewards. These algorithms rely on an oracle, evaluating the dynamic programming operator up to…
In this report, some properties of the set of Nash equilibria (NEs) of $2 \times 2$ zero-sum games are reviewed. In particular, the cardinality of the set of NEs is given in terms of the entries of the payoff matrix. Moreover, closed-form…
The Bimatrix Nash Equilibrium (NE) for $m \times n$ real matrices $R$ and $C$, denoted as the {\it Row} and {\it Column} players, is characterized as follows: Let $\Delta =S_m \times S_n$, where $S_k$ denotes the unit simplex in…
We study the complexity of computing equilibria in two classes of network games based on flows - fractional BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) games and fractional BBC (Bounded Budget Connection) games. BGP is the glue that holds the Internet…
The solution to a Nash or a nonsymmetric bargaining game is obtained by maximizing a concave function over a convex set, i.e., it is the solution to a convex program. We show that each 2-player game whose convex program has linear…
In this paper we present a novel generic mapping between Graphical Games and Markov Random Fields so that pure Nash equilibria in the former can be found by statistical inference on the latter. Thus, the problem of deciding whether a…
The Nash Equilibrium (NE), one of the elegant and fundamental concepts in game theory, plays a crucial part within various fields, including engineering and computer science. However, efficiently computing an NE in normal-form games remains…
We show that the existence of a computationally efficient calibration algorithm, with a low weak calibration rate, would imply the existence of an efficient algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria - thus implying the unlikely…
A fundamental shortcoming of the concept of Nash equilibrium is its computational intractability: approximating Nash equilibria in normal-form games is PPAD-hard. In this paper, inspired by the ideas of smoothed analysis, we introduce a…
Scarf's lemma is one of the fundamental results in combinatorics, originally introduced to study the core of an N-person game. Over the last four decades, the usefulness of Scarf's lemma has been demonstrated in several important…
We study the computation of equilibria of anonymous games, via algorithms that may proceed via a sequence of adaptive queries to the game's payoff function, assumed to be unknown initially. The general topic we consider is \emph{query…
The $\varepsilon$-well-supported Nash equilibrium is a strong notion of approximation of a Nash equilibrium, where no player has an incentive greater than $\varepsilon$ to deviate from any of the pure strategies that she uses in her mixed…
Leadership games provide a powerful paradigm to model many real-world settings. Most literature focuses on games with a single follower who acts optimistically, breaking ties in favour of the leader. Unfortunately, for real-world…
Network games provide a powerful framework for modeling agent interactions in networked systems, where players are represented by nodes in a graph and their payoffs depend on the actions taken by their neighbors. Extending the framework of…
We explore the computational complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria for a new class of strategic games called integer programming games with difference of piecewise linear convex payoffs. Integer programming games are games where…
As the earliest and one of the most fundamental learning dynamics for computing NE, fictitious play (FP) has being receiving incessant research attention and finding games where FP would converge (games with FPP) is one central question in…
We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…
Worst-case hardness results for most equilibrium computation problems have raised the need for beyond-worst-case analysis. To this end, we study the smoothed complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in Network Coordination Games, a…