Related papers: Learning Stationary Correlated Equilibria in Const…
No-regret learning dynamics play a central role in game theory, enabling decentralized convergence to equilibrium for concepts such as Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE) or Correlated Equilibrium (CE). In this work, we improve the…
This paper investigates online stochastic aggregative games subject to local set constraints and time-varying coupled inequality constraints, where each player possesses a time-varying expectation-valued cost function relying on not only…
Zero-sum Linear Quadratic (LQ) games are fundamental in optimal control and can be used (i)~as a dynamic game formulation for risk-sensitive or robust control and (ii)~as a benchmark setting for multi-agent reinforcement learning with two…
We consider the problem of simultaneous learning in stochastic games with many players in the finite-horizon setting. While the typical target solution for a stochastic game is a Nash equilibrium, this is intractable with many players. We…
In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated…
In the context of multi-player, general-sum games, there is an increasing interest in solution concepts modeling some form of communication among players, since they can lead to socially better outcomes with respect to Nash equilibria, and…
Learning in stochastic games is arguably the most standard and fundamental setting in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). In this paper, we consider decentralized MARL in stochastic games in the non-asymptotic regime. In particular,…
Solving feedback Stackelberg games with nonlinear dynamics and coupled constraints, a common scenario in practice, presents significant challenges. This work introduces an efficient method for computing approximate local feedback…
We present a novel statistical approach to incorporating uncertainty awareness in model-free distributional reinforcement learning involving quantile regression-based deep Q networks. The proposed algorithm, $\textit{Calibrated Evidential…
This paper investigates stochastic generalized dynamic games with coupling chance constraints, where agents have incomplete information about uncertainties satisfying a concentration of measure property. This problem, in general, is…
The distributed computation of Nash equilibria is assuming growing relevance in engineering where such problems emerge in the context of distributed control. Accordingly, we present schemes for computing equilibria of two classes of static…
As quantum processors advance, the emergence of large-scale decentralized systems involving interacting quantum-enabled agents is on the horizon. Recent research efforts have explored quantum versions of Nash and correlated equilibria as…
We study N-player finite games with costs perturbed due to time-varying disturbances in the underlying system and to that end, we propose the concept of Robust Correlated Equilibrium that generalizes the definition of Correlated…
Dynamic game arises as a powerful paradigm for multi-robot planning, for which safety constraint satisfaction is crucial. Constrained stochastic games are of particular interest, as real-world robots need to operate and satisfy constraints…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) has found success in settings like poker which have both terminal states and perfect recall. We seek to understand how to relax these requirements. As a first step, we introduce a simple algorithm,…
We consider the problem of learning stable matchings with unknown preferences in a decentralized and uncoordinated manner, where "decentralized" means that players make decisions individually without the influence of a central platform, and…
We study the global convergence of policy optimization for finding the Nash equilibria (NE) in zero-sum linear quadratic (LQ) games. To this end, we first investigate the landscape of LQ games, viewing it as a nonconvex-nonconcave…
This paper examines the convergence of no-regret learning in games with continuous action sets. For concreteness, we focus on learning via "dual averaging", a widely used class of no-regret learning schemes where players take small steps…
We show that computing approximate stationary Markov coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) in general-sum stochastic games is computationally intractable, even when there are two players, the game is turn-based, the discount factor is an…
As a primary contribution, we present a convergence theorem for stochastic iterations, and in particular, Q-learning iterates, under a general, possibly non-Markovian, stochastic environment. Our conditions for convergence involve an…